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SUMMARY 
The thesis presents four papers that begin to 
analyse transnational monopoly capitalism: 
(1) Paper One attempts to fill a gap in the literature 
by examining the impact of intra-firm imports (and exports) 
on the theoretical specification of the degree of monopoly. 
It shows that an industry's degree of monopoly need not 
fall when import penetration-rises. United Kingdom car 
industry data is used to examine the bias in estimating 
the degree of monopoly when ignoring intra-firm imports. 
(2) Paper Two explores the conjectural variation model 
underlying such a theoretical specification. In particular, 
it criticises the model for saying little about the deter- 
minants of industry equilibrium. It suggests collusion 
amongst firms focusing on the possibility of joint profit 
maximisation be given the centre stage, and that equilib- 
rium be analysed in terms of its deviation from the joint 
maximum, the deviation depending upon firms' retaliatory 
power, cost functions, and demand functions. 
(3) Paper Three considers another question arising in (1): 
why are there transnational corporations? It pursues a 
Marglinian analysis. A general theoretical framework based 
upon product market domination is developed, and one aspect 
of this - labour market domination - is taken up in 
theoretical and empirical detail. Particular emphasis is 
given to distributional as against efficiency considerations. 
Throughout, the analysis is compared to other approaches - for instance, internalisation. 
(4) Paper Four pursues the theory of the firm by taking up 
the fundamental issue of who controls firms. In contrast 
to existing literature, it criticises ex post analysis of' 
share distributions, and uses a dynamic, historical frame- 
work in concluding that owners control firms. This is 
supported by examining recently reported empirical 
evidence. Consideration of the M-form organisation, and 
savings behaviour is used to further discriminate the 
analysis from managerialism and neoclassicism respectively. 
-8- 
PART ONE 
INTRODUCTION: AIM AND FORMAT OF THE THESIS 
-9- 
Although there is a vast literature on transnational 
corporations - i. e. firms with production facilities in 
more than one country - their presence has not been analysed 
in any detail in the monopoly capitalism framework studied, 
for example, by Kalecki (1939), Baran and Sweezy (1966), 
and Cowling (1982a). 
The aim of the work contained in this thesis is to 
begin the analysis of monopoly capitalism in a world 
where transnational corporations exist; i. e. to begin the 
analysis of transnational monopoly capitalism. 
This beginning is contained in the four papers 
written, at least in their earlier versions, in the 
period October 1981 to September 1983, the period during 
which the author received an SSRC Ph. D. studentship. In. 
Parts Two and Three, these papers are reproduced 
without alteration in their most recent versions, 
save for changes in references and layout, now 
the same throughout the thesis. They are its essence. 
Each is a distinct paper, and should be read as such. 
Their relationship is simply that they are all part of 
the general aim to analyse transnational monopoly 
capitalism. Most importantly, there is no attempt to 
explore the implications of one paper for another, other 
than in brief introductory comments to Parts Two and 
Three, and other than in the extent to which the papers 
- 10 - 
actually refer to each other. Any further analysis must 
await a subsequent treatment in future papers, or even 
in books - i. e. in forms readily accessible to interested 
persons. This represents the best use of scarce research 
time. The underlying philosophy is that if a point is 
worth making, it should be made in a form easily obtained 
by researchers and others. 
The presentation of the papers in two parts of the 
thesis reflects the fact that two of the papers are 
primarily concerned with the specification of the degree 
of monopoly - albeit Paper Two is written in more general 
terms - whilst the remaining papers recognise the need 
for a detailed analysis of the theory of the firm if 
transnational monopoly capitalism is to be fully under- 
stood. Parts Two and Three both contain introductory 
comments summarising the papers and briefly stating why 
the analysis in question was undertaken. 
- 11 - 
PART TWO 
THE SPECIFICATION OF THE DEGREE OF MONOPOLY 
- 12 - 
An obvious starting point for the analysis of 
transnational monopoly capitalism is to fill a clear, 
gap in the existing literature. This is the concern of 
Paper One. 
Kalecki (1939) shows that the functional distribution 
of income, is a function of (among other things) the degree 
of monopoly. Moreover, recent literature has emphasised 
the formal derivation of a theoretical specification for 
the degree of monopoly. In a model of the closed economy, 
Cowling (1976) and Cowling and Waterson (1976) relate , 
an industry's degree of monopoly to its Herfindahl, _index 
of concentration, degree of apparent collusion, and price 
elasticity of demand. International trade is introduced 
to the model by Lyons (1981a), allowing for imports from 
overseas corporations - i. e. firms which do not produce 
in the domestic market. However, as Cowling (1982a) has 
pointed out, this ignores the possibility of a transnational 
corporation engaging in domestic-production and importing 
from its overseas affiliates. 
The aim of Paper One is,. using a simple model of 
production, and focusing on the functional distribution 
of income, to rectify this omission. A theoretical 
specification for the degree of monopoly allowing for intra- 
firm imports is formulated. Comparing the analysis with 
recent literature, it is shown that a rise in an industry's 
import penetration need not imply a fall in the degree 
of monopoly. Moreover, data for the United Kingdom new 
- 13 - 
motor car industry is used to assess the bias that 
results from ignoring intra-firm imports when estimating 
the degree of monopoly. It is also pointed out that an 
identical framework can be employed to analyse intra- 
firm exports. 
In examining the formal derivation of a theoretical 
specification for the degree of monopoly, a crucial 
question arises, namely: what does the specification 
really mean? Concern with this question underlines Paper 
Two. The formal derivation uses a conjectural variation 
model to analyse industry equilibrium. Paper Two considers 
difficulties with such an analysis, and suggests an 
alternative. 
In particular, the paper criticises the conjectural 
variation model for saying little about the determinants 
of industry equilibrium. It therefore examines more closely 
the behaviour underlying firms' actions. Collusion amongst 
firms focusing on the possibility of joint profit maximisa- 
tion is brought to the centre of the stage. It is suggested 
that industry equilibrium be analysed in terms of its 
deviation from the joint profit maximum, the deviation 
depending upon firms' retaliatory power, cost functions, 
and demand functions. This is illustrated by examining 
the formal specification of a firm's price-cost margin. 
- 14 - 
None of this means to say that Paper One is worthless; 
it at least continues to fill a gap in the existing 
literature. 
£(. 
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PAPER ONE 
THE DEGREE OF MONOPOLY, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, AND 
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS. * 
# Published in. the International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, 1983. 
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 
ninth annual conference of the European Association for 
Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE), Leuven, 
September, 1982. 
Final version of this paper completed-December, 1982. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Kalecki (1939) shows that the-share of national income 
accruing to the wage earning sector of the subordinate 
classes1) is a function of (among other things) the degree 
of monopoly (defined as the price-cost margin). Drawing upon 
a considerable body of literature, this approach has been 
extended in Cowling (1981) and (1982a). 
Particularly important has been-the formal derivation 
of a theoretical specification for the degree of monopoly. 
Cowling (1976), and Cowling and Waterson (1976) consider 
a closed economy and relate an industry's degree of monopoly 
to its Herfindahl index of concentration, degree of apparent 
collusion, and price elasticity of demand. Lyons (1981, a) 
brings international trade into the model, allowing for 
imports from overseas corporations - i. e. firms which do not 
produce in the domestic market. However, as Cowling (1982a) 
indicates, this ignores the possibility of a transnational 
corporation, a firm which produces in more than one country, 
engaging in domestic production and importing from its 
overseas affiliates. 
The importance of such trade is difficult to quantify, 
due to lack of data. Nevertheless, Panic and Joyce (1980) 
assert that the proportion of U. K. imports of manufactured 
goods coming from "related enterprises" may be similar to 
that estimated for the U. S. A., namely 50%. 
2) Detailed 
information is available for the U. K. new motor car industry; 
Table 1 shows, for example, that intra-firm trade by 
- 17 - 
TABLE 1. IMPORTS BY DOMESTICALLY PRODUCING TNC's AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL IMPORTED NEW REGISTRATIONS 
OF NEW CARS IN THE U. K., 1975-1978*. 
1975 1976 1977 1978 
7.1 20.0 26.7 29.2 
* The category denoted "others" in the data are assumed to 
be imports by overseas corporations. The percentages reported 
are thus lower bounds. 
Source: compiled from Tables 23 and 24 of SMMT (1979). 
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transnational corporations (TNC's) producing in the domestic 
(i. e. U. K. ) market accounted for nearly 30% of U. K. imports 
in 1978. Clearly, the phenomenon is a significant character- 
istic of international trade. 
Thus, ignoring intra-firm imports in the theoretical 
specification'of the degree of monopoly is potentially a 
grave omission from the-Kaleckian analysis. The aim of this 
paper is, in the context of a simple model, to rectify this 
omission and consider some implications for the analysis. 
The framework developed can also be used to analyse the 
phenomenon of intra-firm exports. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 
outlines a model of production in an industry of profit 
maximising firms producing a homogeneous good. This is 
used in Section 3 to derive an expression for the degree 
of monopoly - the mathematical detail being relegated to 
an appendix - and hence for the functional distribution of 
income. Sections 4 and 5 highlight important aspects of 
the analysis by comparing it with previous work. Some con- 
clusions are drawn in Section 6. 
- 19 - 
2. A MODEL OF PRODUCTION 
Consider an industry characterised by four fundamental 
assumptions: 
(1) each. firm in the. industry produces exactly the same. __, . 
product. Although product differentiation is often emphasised 
as an-important characteristic of TITIC's - see, for example, 
Caves (1971) - the homogeneity assumption is not altogether 
unrealistic, as illustrated in Table 2. For instance, in 
1978 Ford imported 31.2% of its Fiesta and 22.4% of its 
Cortina ranges, while Leyland imported 16.7% of its Allegro 
model. Moreover, the cross elasticities of demand for sep- 
arate models are likely to be significantly positive, making 
the homogeneity assumption a reasonable simplification at 
least for the motor car industry. 
(2) each firm producing in the domestic market maximises its 
profit. This assumption is typically made throughout the 
Kaleckian analysis; it is justified in, for example, Cowling 
(1982a). The familiar condition for profit maximisation is 
that a firm equates its marginal costs of supply to a market 
with its perceived marginal revenue. I. e. firm r maximises 
profits in the domestic market when 
C=f (Q) +Q 
df (Q) 
. 
dQ (1) rr dQ dQr 
where: 
- 20 - 
TABLE 2. IMPORTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL NEW REGISTRA- 
TIONS OF NEW CARS IN THE U. K., BY MODEL LINE, 
1975-1978. 
MODEL 1975 1976 1977 1978 
MINI 0 0 0 7.4 
ALLEGRO 0 0 4.6 16.7 
HUNTER 0 -0 50.0 98.0 
ALPINE 100 81.0 9.1 0.3 
FIESTA -* -* 0.3 31.2 
ESCORT 0 7.3 9.0 13.8 
. CORTINA -0 
0 1.6 22.4 
CAPRI 0 20.9 100 100 
GRANADA 0 40.1 - 100 - 100 
CAVALIER 100 100 97.1 63.5 
* Fiesta not produced at all in these years. 
Source: compiled from Tables 23 and 24 of SM14T (1979). 
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Cr firm is marginal cost of supplying the 
domestic market. - 
Qr firm r 's total sales in the domestic market. 
3) 
Q total industry sales in the domestic market. 
f(Q) = the inverse demand-function in the domestic 
market. 
The concept of perceived marginal revenue-arises from the 
fact that dQ/dQr is firm r 's conjecture regarding the change 
in total domestic sales resulting from a marginal change 
in Qr. 
(3) the industry comprises four types of firm: 
(a) importing TNC's - firms which produce by domestic 
and overseas production, and whose only involvement 
in international trade is to import into the domestic 
market. 
(b) non-importing TNC's - firms which produce by 
domestic and overseas production, but which have no 
involvement in international trade, neither exporting 
from nor importing into the domestic market. 
(c) domestic corporations - firms which only produce 
in the domestic market,, and which have no involve- 
ment in international trade. 
(d) overseas; corporations-- firms which only produce 
overseas, and which import into the domestic market. 
- 22 - 
(4) imports from overseas corporations are not controlled by 
domestic producers. As Cowling (1982a) points out, -in reality 
domestic producers can control imports either by producing 
the imports themselves, or by having agency agreements with 
overseas corporations, but the latter possibility is-not- 
considered in this analysis. The purpose *of this and the 
previous assumption is to focus attention on intra-firm 
imports. This should not be taken to imply that, for example, 
agency agreements are unimportant. 
The remainder of this section considers in more detail 
production by domestic producers, namely: importing TNC's, 
non-importing TNC's, and domestic corporations. 
4) First of 
all, it is worthwhile specifying some notation. For the 
nth domestic producer, define: 
Dn total domestic production 
Mn overseas production for domestic sale. 
The essence of an importing TNC is-that it supplies the 
domestic market from plants located in the domestic and the 
overseas sectors. A firm supplying a market from several 
plants maximises profits when the marginal supply costs from 
each plant are identical, and equal to perceived marginal 
revenue. In terms of equation (1) (and denoting the typical 
importing TNC by an i subscript) Ci is the common value of 
the marginal costs of supplying the domestic market from 
. domestic or overseas production. Moreover, Q. comprises both 
the importing TNC's total domestic production, Di, and 
its imports, Mi. 
- 23 - 
It is useful to consider a particular model of intra- 
firm trade. To simplify the analysis, without undermining 
any conclusions that will be drawn, assume: 
(i) firm i has one plant in the domestic market and one 
plant overseas. 
(ii) marginal production costs in each plant are inverse L 
shaped. Whilst this simplifies the analysis, it is in any 
case unrealistic only insofar as marginal production costs 
tend to be constant until near capacity working, , when, 
they 
rise rapidly -. see, for example, Scherer (19 30) . 
(iii) marginal non-production costs associated with imports - 
for instance, tariff and transport costs -, are constant. 
(iv) the TNC satisfies its overseas demand with excess cap- 
acity remaining in its overseas production facilities. This, 
will be given greater consideration in due course. 
(v) the TNC faces a linear downward sloping marginal revenue 
curve in its overseas market. Locally at the point where 
overseas demand is satisfied, the downward slope is implied 
by profit maximisation: given assumptions (ii) and (iv), if 
the marignal revenue curve is upward sloping, profits could 
be increased by increasing overseas sales. The assumption of 
linearity is made merely for simplicity. 
Two possibilities are of interest. The first is depicted 
- 24 - 
in Figure 1 where, for firm i: 
MCD = the marginal cost of supplying the domestic" 
market from domestic production. 
MCM = the marginal cost of supplying the domestic 
market from overseas production. 
MC . the marginal cost of supplying the domestic 
market. 
If, for example, i's perceived marginal revenue is 
such that it sells OC in the domestic market, both domestic 
and overseas plants are operated at full capacity, pro- 
ducing OA and AC respectively for domestic sale. Sales 
exceeding OC are obtained at the expense of sales overseas. 
Beyond OC the marginal cost of supplying the domestic market 
is upward sloping because of assumption (v), which implies 
that the marginal revenue foregone in not making a sale 
overseas (i. e. the marginal cost of supplying the domestic 
market) is increasing. Total capacity of domestic and over- 
seas plant is given by OJ. 
Long run considerations suggest domestic sales will be 
less than OC. Firm i will be uneasy diverting sales from 
its overseas to its domestic market because rivals may con- 
strue this as a willingness by i to reduce its overseas 
market share, which may be detrimental to long run profit 
maximisation if i's rivals consequently attempt to increase 
their overseas market share. In addition, arguments made in 
Cowling (1982a) regarding entry deterrence and, following 
- 25 - 
MCI 
1 
MC 
F 
E 
MCM 
1 
4i= Di+ M1 
FIGURE 1: THE COST CONDITIONS FACING AN, IMPORTING TNC : 
CASE I. 
U ti is CJ 
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Chenery (1952), optimal investment strategy in a world of 
scale economies and growing demand, suggests that the TNC 
will desire excess capacity somewhere in its production 
empire. Given the definition of an importing TNC, a firm 
faced by a case I cost configuration will always hold this 
excess capacity overseas (thereby justifying assumption (iv), 
above). 
Thus it is reasonable to expect i's perceived marginal 
revenue in the domestic market to be such that, for example, 
total domestic sales are given by OB. Domestic plant will 
then operate at full capacity, supplying OA to the domestic 
market, whilst overseas plant will operate with excess cap- 
acity and supply AB. 
The second possibility of interest is depicted in 
Figure 2, which should be interpreted similarly to Figure 1. 
At less than full capacity working in each plant, marginal 
supply cost from domestic production is now higher than that 
from overseas production, at least up to a certain level of 
imports. The arguments regarding entry deterrence, optimal 
investment'strategy, and excess capacity suggest that sales 
can reasonably be expected to be, for example, OC. In this 
case, overseas plant operates at full capacity, supplying 
OB to the domestic market, whilst the excess capacity is 
in the domestic plant, used to supply BC. Of the quantity 
imported, AB is diverted from overseas sales. If long run 
considerations mean the firm is reluctant to divert sales 
from overseas, AB will tend to zero - i. e. the long run 
marginal opportunity cost of supplying the domestic market 
- 27 - 
MC 
L 
1 
MC 
E 
C 
MC 
vy 
FIGURE 2: THE COST CONDITIONS FACING AN IMPORTING TNC: 
i 
Qi=Di+Mi 
CASE II. 
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from overseas production tends-to infinity once overseas 
production reaches full capacity. In this situation, the 
TNC will only import if it has satisfied overseas demand 
with excess capacity remaining in its overseas plant (thereby 
justifying assumption (iv), above). If, however, the firm 
is not reluctant to divert sales from overseas, importing 
does not require excess capacity in the overseas plant once 
overseas demand has been satisfied. 
In reality, either of the cost situations depicted in 
these two cases might be observed. For instance, reserves 
of cheap labour in "less developed" countries suggests 
marginal production costs overseas will be less than in 
the U. K., but once marginal non-production costs associated 
with imports are taken into account, this need not be true 
of marginal supply costs to the U. K. - Chandler (1980), for 
example, suggests that, historically, transportation costs 
have been an important factor. Moreover, marginal production 
costs are determined by productivity as well as wage rates-. 
The nationality of a TNC is particularly important in this 
respect; a firm will face higher marginal costs in an un- 
familiar environment because, for example, it has no ex- 
perience of the best way to control, supervise, and therefore 
exploit'local labour - see, for instance, Aharoni (1966) 
and Hymer (1960). In addition, "developed" as compared to 
less developed countries can offer firms positive-external- 
ities arising from their superior infrastructure - for 
example, a good health service should enable firms to 
extract more work from their employees. 
- 29 - 
It is similarly impossible to determine, ex ante, which 
cost configuration is most likely when a TNC is producing 
in two developed countries. Relative labour costs, famil- 
iarity with environment, and externalities must again be 
weighed against each other. 
In the long run, it could be argued that TNC's will 
supply the domestic market entirely from the area with the 
lowest supply cost, by increasing the latter's capacity. 
But this ignores the global character of TNC domination; 
marginal supply cost, for instance, may be lower for over- 
seas (domestic) production precisely because there is also 
domestic (overseas) production. This is clearly seen in the 
way Ford have threatened to switch production overseas 
unless domestic productivity improves - see CIS'(1978). 
There are also potentially grave risks in a TNC locating 
production entirely in one country - for instance, the impo- 
sition of import tariffs may leave it in a very vulnerable 
position compared to its rivals. 
The second type of firm to consider is a non-importing 
TNC. In terms of equation (1) (and denoting the typical 
firm by aj subscript) Cj is the firm's marginal costs of 
domestic production, and Qj simply the firm's total domestic 
production (Di). Assuming inverse L shaped marginal produc- 
tion costs, j can reasonably be expected to produce, for 
example, OA in Figure 3 (which should be interpreted 
similarly to Figures 1 and 2). 
- 30 - 
roc 
Qj =Dý 
FIGURE 3: THE COST CONDITIONS FACED. BY. A NON-IMPORTING TNC. 
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The presence of excess capacity can be justified using 
the arguments put in Cowling (1982a). It should be noted 
that reliance on the Chenery (1952) analysis implicitly 
assumes a growing domestic demand to be satisfied from domes- 
tic production, which excludes, for example, a growing 
domestic demand which the firm intends to satisfy by becoming 
an importing TNC. As regards entry deterrence, all that is 
really necessary is that the TNC has spare capacity some- 
where in its empire, and that its threat to use this to 
increase domestic market sales is credible. However, excess 
capacity in domestic production is, prima facie, a . 
more 
credible deterrent than spare capacity overseas for a firm 
serving the domestic market entirely from domestic production. 
What prevents non-importing TNC's from engaging in 
international trade? Importing TNC's trade because domestic 
capacity is insufficient to satisfy domestic demand, or 
because marginal supply costs from overseas are less than 
from domestic production. It is feasible that other TNC's 
face different conditions, for example: investment decisions 
may have differed across TNC's in the past, giving different 
capacity constraints, or it could be that marginal non- 
production import costs are much higher for some firms than 
for others, for instance because some have access to cheap 
shipping facilities. 
Similarly, not all firms need be transnational. For 
example, it may not be worthwhile for a firm to produce 
overseas because it cannot get access to the cheap labour 
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used by rivals, perhaps due to government interference... 
Firm organisation and management capacity are particularly 
relevant; heterogeneous management quality may make over- 
seas operations by some firms especially costly, for 
instance - see Aharoni (1966), and Hymer (1975). 
Production by a non transnational firm, i. e. by, a_ 
domestic corporation, can also be represented by Figure 3. 
In this case, entry deterrence and optimal investment 
strategy arguments provide clear justification for the hold- 
ing of excess capacity. In terms of equation (1) (and denot- 
ing the typical domestic corporation by ak subscript) Ck 
is the firm's marginal production cost in the domestic market, 
and Qk the firm's total domestic production (i. e. Qk = Dk). 
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3. THE DEGREE OF MONOPOLY AND THE FUNCTIONAL DISTRIBUTION 
OF INCOME 
The task now is to use the model'of production out- 
lined in Section 2 to obtain a theoretical specification 
for the degree of monopoly, and to consider, in the light 
of the model, how this can be used to analyse the functional 
distribution of income. 
Based upon equation (1), the following expression for 
the degree of monopoly is derived in the Appendix for an 
industry of N firms involved in domestic production: 
u_a+ 
[1-a] 
T 
[D+MTNC1 
DM nn 
where: 
N 
I[f (4) -Cn]-D n 
n-1 
f(W)"D = the industry's (weighted average) 
degree of monopoly. 
N Dn Dn+Mn 
T= 
n=1 
D D+Mmc 
a- the industry's (weighted average) conjectural 
elasticity 
n- the absolute value of the industry's domestic 
price elasticity-of demand 
D total domestic production in the industry 
N 
D 
n=1 n 5) N 
MTNC = total imports by importing TNC's I Mn 
n=1 
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M- total imports in the industry. 
Equation (2) is discussed in greater depth in the 
following two sections. For the moment, simply consider 
the definition of u, the degree'of monopoly. The denomina- 
tor of u is the total revenue obtained by the industry from 
domestic production. As for the numerator, consider each 
type of domestic producer in turn: 
(a) from Figure 3, for the jth non-importing TNC, 
(f(Q)-Ci ]-Di is the profit from and fixed costs of domestic 
production, because the firm produces where marginal cost 
equals average variable cost. 
(b) for the kth domestic producer, [f(Q)-Ck]"Dk is 
similarly the profit from and fixed costs of domestic pro- 
duction. 
(c) for importing TNC's, the position is more complicated. 
For a firm facing a case II cost configuration, [f(Q)-Ci]"Di 
is again the profit from and fixed costs of domestic produc- 
tion, but under a case I situation, [f(Q)-Ci]"Di understates 
these profits and fixed costs because marginal cost exceeds 
the average variable cost of domestic production. 
Therefore, u is the lower bound on the share of profit 
(II) from and fixed costs (F) of domestic production in the 
total revenue (R) obtained from domestic production: 
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li+F 
uR ý3ý 
Following Cowling and Molho (1982), define Y as the industry's 
value added in domestic production, and W as the industry's 
wage bill. Then, assuming marginal production costs comprise 
solely raw material and wage costs, (3) can be rearranged: 
uRs 
Y-W 
YY 
I. e. 
YS 1- µY (4) 
The share of value added generated by domestic produc- 
tion accruing to the wage earning sector is thus a function 
of u and R/Y. 
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4. A COMPARISON. WITH PREVIOUS ANALYSES: I 
In this and the following section, a comparison with 
previous work is used to highlight important aspects of 
the analysis presented in Section 3. 
Cowling (1982a) considers the case in which there are 
no imports from overseas corporations. In such a situation, 
equation (2) can be rewritten: 
+ 
[1-a] T (5) u 
In contrast, Cowling (1982a) examines the result 
6): 
' 
N[f (4) ]-[D- [Dn+Mn] 
=a 
[1-a'*] 
n=1 
f(Q) "[ Dn+Mn In+n 
HDM (6 ) 
where 
ND +M 
2 
HDM L D+M - the Herfindahl index of concentra- 
n=1 
tion defined over total industry 
sales. 
The essential difference between these results is that the 
Cowling (1982a) analysis refers to the degree of monopoly 
defined over domestic sales, whereas (5) refers to the degree 
of monopoly defined over domestic production. As is clear 
from Section 3, the output over which the degree of monopoly 
is defined determines the definition of "income" in an 
analysis of income distribution; equation (5) focuses upon 
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the income of'a country, whereas (6) emphasises the income 
from a given product, no matter where it'is produced. ' 
Although both are of interest, the emphasis of-the Kaleckian 
analysis upon class struggle suggests that equation (5) has 
more use. 
The practical difficulties facing subordinate classes 
attempting to confront their dominant counterparts'on a 
world scale are immense. Of necessity, the class'struggle 
is fought at the level of a particular country. This is 
not to say that the class struggle can be understood by 
ignoring occurrences elsewhere, in the world. On the contrary, 
the domination of transnational capital is, in its very 
nature, global, and can only be understood as such. Imper- 
ialist domination of less developed countries, for example, 
can run hand in hand with the de-industrialisation of more 
"advanced" countries - see, for instance, Hymer (1975). 
This suggests a need to define a relationship concern- 
ing the distribution of total domestic production, but with 
the relationship being understood and interpreted within a 
global framework. 
Concern with a country's income, rather than the income 
from a given product, has two implications for the theoret- 
ical specification of a degree of monopoly. Firstly, the 
weights used in the industry's weighted average conjectural 
elasticity vary in the two situations; thus, a differs from 
a'. Nevertheless, both a and a' capture the conjectural 
elasticities, and can be interpreted as a degree of apparent 
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collusion -see Cowling (1981a), and Cubbin (1975). Secondly, 
the Herfindahl concentration index is replaced by the index 
T in the theoretical specification. T is also an index of 
sales concentration. 
In general, very low values of T imply that 
(a) every domestic producer has a-very small share 
in domestic production for domestic sale, or 
(b) 14TNC is very large compared to D, and those firms 
with a large share in domestic production for domestic 
sales have a very small share in imports by importing 
TNC's. 
High values of T suggest 
(a) each of (at most) a few importing TNC's have a 
very large share in both domestic production for 
domestic sale, and in imports by importing TNC's, or 
(b) MTNC is very small compared to D, and each of 
(at most) a few corporations dominate domestic-pro- 
duction for domestic sale. 
However, examination of the changes in T across and within 
industries is the only way of fully understanding the index - 
no attempt at such an examination has been made. 
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An analysis of the distribution of a country's income 
should also encompass export production, excluded from the 
model in Section 2 by assumption. The reason for this 
exclusion is because exports add no theoretical difficulties, 
Similarly to the way in which an expression for u was ob- 
tained, in a model containing exports, profit maximising 
conditions for the overseas market can be used to obtain a 
formulation for p, a weighted average of firms' price-cost 
margins in the overseas market, where the weights are each' 
firm's export share. Following Lyons (1981a) and, for 
simplicity, assuming constant marginal costs of supply: 
II+F f (Q)" D r"X 
= 11 (7) f (Q) "D+r"X f (Q) "D+r"X 
+p. f (Q) "D+r" X 
where r is the equilibrium price'in the overseas market, 
and X is total exports from the domestic market. 
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S. A COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS ANALYSES: II 
ConsiderSnow the analysis in Lyons (1981a), which con- 
cerns the derivation and empirical estimation of a theoret- 
ical specification for the degree of monopoly. The analysis 
assumes all imports are from overseas corporations, in which 
case equation (2) becomes: 
_a+ 
[1-a) 
HD un TI [D+M] 
(8) 
Had Lyons (1981a) used conjectural elasticities'-rather than 
total conjectural variation parameters, the result would 
have been equation (8). Thus, as regards imports in'a homo- 
geneous good industry, the difference between the analysis 
of Section 3 and that of Lyons (1981a) is in the role played 
by intra-firm imports; no less should have been expected. 
Nevertheless, there are important implications arising 
from the introduction of intra-firm imports. Consider first 
the consequences of an increased import penetration. 
A conclusion drawn in Lyons (1981a) is that "a ceteris 
paribus increase in import penetration leads to an unam- 
biguous decrease in potential profitability", i. e. to a fall 
in u. It does indeed follow from equation (2) that a ceteris 
paribus rise in imports by overseas corporations - the only 
type of imports examined by Lyons (1981a) - leads to an 
ff) 
unambiguous fall in u. It must be explained however, that 
this only refers to ceteris' paribus changes. In the. model 
of production outlined in Section 2, an overseas corporation 
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is assumed to maximise profits. As shown in equation (1), 
for firm g, the typical overseas corporation, profit max- 
imisation in the domestic market requires: 
C=f (4) +M 
df (4) 
. 
dQ 
9g dQ dM 9 
(9) 
where Mg is firm g's imports into the domestic market. A 
change in M implies an alteration in the exogenous variables 
underlying equation (9), for example a change in g's marginal 
supply costs. But to the extent that conjectural elasticities 
depend upon a rival's costs, this implies a change in the 
conjectural elasticities held by domestic producers, and 
hence possible changes in Qn. Acute difficulties can arise 
in determining the new equilibrium resulting from such 
changes, difficulties which will not be confronted here; 
suffice it to point out that the conclusion reached in Lyons 
(1981a) does not claim that any increase in import penetra- 
tion resulting from an increase in imports by overseas cor- 
porations will necessarily imply a fall in 
Similar problems can arise when considering changes in 
MTNC' The relationship given by equation (2) is derived 
from profit maximising conditions for domestic producers. 
These conditions also determine each firm's domestic pro- 
duction and imports, meaning that neither D nor MTNC are 
exogenous variables in the model. Despite this, it can still 
be shown that a rise in import penetration may cause a rise 
in u. 
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Consider firm i, an importing TNC characterised by costs 
as depicted in case II, above. Suppose marginal supply 
costs to the domestic market are initially given by the 
unbroken line in Figure 4. If marginal supply costs from 
overseas production are now reduced, marginal supply costs 
to the domestic market are given by the curve EFDGHJ. 
This cost change will not alter i's perceived marginal 
revenue. Crucial to this outcome is the fact that Ci is 
unchanged; to the extent that'i's rivals hold conjectural 
elasticities determined by i's costs, Ci is the important 
parameter because, in equilibrium, this is i's marginal 
cost of supplying the market. 
Although i's total domestic sales are unchanged, imports 
rise at the expense of domestic production for domestic 
sale by the amount CD. Import penetration has increased. 
(This implies a willingness by i to divert sales from its 
overseas market, otherwise BC and FD would be vertical and 
CD zero. However, without such a willingness, marginal pro- 
duction costs which rise sharply but not vertically as 
overseas output reaches full capacity would still give rise 
to a non-zero CD. ) 
The consequent change in u is given: 
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D, 
A 
E 
0 Qi=Di+Ml 
FIGURE 4: INCREASED IMPORT PENETRATION IN A CASE II COST 
SITUATION. 
44 
du. PRODUCT PRICE 
= 
all dD. 
3D 1 
Cn Vn=1,..., N 
Dn ünýi 
N 
f (Q)" D"Ci-f (Q) "i CnDn 
2=1 " dDi 
[f(Q)"D] 
N 
n11Cn"Dn 
Ci"D 
_f 
(Q) "D2 
cdDi (10) 
Given dDi<O, the condition for u to rise is: 
N 
Cn" Dn < Ci" D 
n=1 
This requires that firm i has high marginal supply costs 
relative to its rivals. If, for example, is is a TNC with 
overseas nationality, this is quite possible. 
(11) 
Thus, a rise in import penetration in an industry can 
be accompanied by a rise in the degree of monopoly. It can 
at least be concluded that the picture presented in Lyons 
(1981a) is not complete. 
Introducing intra-firm imports into the analysis also 
has important consequences as regards estimating the level 
of the degree of monopoly, as can be illustrated by examining 
the U. K. new motor car industry. 
The first problem is to determine a measure of the bias 
in the Lyons (1981a) analysis. Consider the term en, defined: 
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[f (4)-Cn] "Dn 
on f (4) "D 
As u is the sum of on over all n, errors in estimating on 
imply errors in estimating u. It can be shown that use of 
the Lyons (1981a) analysis may imply significant under- 
estimates in on' 
From equation (1),. the typical domestic producer in the 
model outlined in Section 2 profit maximises when 
0 
df (Q) dQ f (Q) - cn - Qn dQ dQn (12) 
In the Lyons (1981a) analysis, the typical firm profit max- 
imises when 
_ 
df (Q) dQ f (Q) - Cn -Dn dQ dDn (13) 
The terms dQ/dQn and dQ/dDn in equations (12) and (13) res- 
pectively are effectively identical, given the homogeneous 
good assumption (and can be denoted by 0); each represents 
firm n's conjecture regarding the effect on total sales of 
a marginal change in firm n's sales. 
Define: 
On = the value of On calculated by using equation (12) 
6n :.. the value of 0n calculated by using equation (13) 
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Then, 
S -Dn df (Q) On = Qn f (Q) "D dQ 
and 
(14) 
0L =D 
df (Q) (15) 
nn f(Q)"D dQ 
The arguments put throughout this paper imply that (14) is 
an accurate measure of 0n; i. e. On = On. 
From (14) and (15), the proportionate error that 
results from calculating on by using the Lyons (1981a) 
analysis rather than (14) is given by an, defined: 
Qn-Dn Mn 
vn Qn Dn+Mn 
I. e. the Lyons (1981a) analysis underestimates u by an"100%; 
for all except importing TNC's, Mn=Qn=O, but for importing 
TNC's, an>O. 
The consequent error in calculating u is c"100%, where 
N 
_ n=1 
cy no 
en 
N 
E en 
n=1 
In practice, On cannot be calculated from 0s because, 
for example, 0 is unknown. If reliable, alternative estimates 
of On are unavailable, it is useful to consider the range, 
of values that e may take. Define: 
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aMIN - the minimum value of an, over all n=1,2,..., N. 
v= the maximum value of an, over all n=1,2,..., N. 
Then, 
aMIN 5e5 vMAX (16) 
Table 3 reports values of an. * 100 for new registrations 
of new cars produced by the four major domestic manufacturers 
in the U. K. car industry. 
8) From (16), the Lyons (1981a) 
analysis would lead to an underestimate of u by 4-37% in 
1978,0-40% in 1977,0-34% in 1976, and 0-17% in 1975. The 
lower bound in each year is due to the low level of Leyland's 
cars that are imported; apart from Ford in 1975, the per- 
centage of total domestic sales imported by the remaining 
producers is consistently very high. 
Care must be taken in attempting to be more specific 
than this because accurate calculation of 0n is impossible. 
The obvious candidate for consideration is the estimation 
of On by the ratio of firm n's profit from and fixed costs 
of domestic production for domestic sale - see Section 3. 
However, this is impossible. Cars are not the only goods 
produced by firms involved in the car industry - in particu- 
lar, commercial vehicles are important - yet published profit 
and turnover data refers to all activities by a company. 
Moreover, fixed costs of domestic production for domestic 
sale cannot be measured because each firm also has substan- 
tial exports - domestic production for overseas sale - and, 
indeed, company specific data on all fixed costs is unavailable. 
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TABLE 3; an"100 IN THE U. K. NEW CAR INDUSTRY, 1975-1978. 
YEAR CHRYSLER FORD GENERAL MOTORS LEYLAND 
1975 17.8 0.2 10.8 0 
1976 28.7 8.9 34.8 0 
1977 18.8 25.4 40.9 0.8 
1978 11.7* 35.2 37.2 4.2 
* Where the production source is unspecified, it is assumed 
to be domestic. The only occasion on which this could be 
significant is for Chrysler in 1978. This figure is thus only 
a lower bound. 
Source: compiled from data on new registrations of new cars 
in Tables 23 and 24 of SMMT (1979). 
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Nevertheless, ignoring these difficulties, it is worth 
examining the crude approximations to 0n - and hence u and 
c-100 - reported in Table 4. The estimates were obtained from 
data relating to all activities of four companies: 
(a) BL LTD., the holding company ultimately responsible 
for the production and distribution of 
Leyland vehicles worldwide. 
(b) Chrysler United Kingdom Ltd., (during the period 
1975-1978) a subsidiary of the U. S. based 
Chrysler Corporation, but with its own 
subsidiaries outside the U. K. in Eire. 
Responsible for the production and distri- 
bution of Chrysler vehicles in the U. K. 
(c) Ford Motor Co. Ltd., a subsidiary of the Ford Motor Co. 
of U. S. A., and also with its own subsid- 
iaries in Eire. Responsible for the pro- 
duction and distribution of Ford vehicles 
in the U. K. 
(d) Vauxhall Motors Ltd., a subsidiary-of the US based 
General Motors Corporation and responsible 
for the production and distribution of 
Vauxhall and Bedford vehicles in the U. K. 
For each company, data was obtained from EXTEL regard- 
ing gross pretax profit, interest payments, turnover, and 
total employment. The latter statistic was used to 
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approximate the fixed costs of each company not covered by 
gross pretax profit and interest. These "other fixed costs" 
were estimated by the multiple of: 
(i) the ratio of company employees to total 
employees in the U. K. motor vehicle manu- 
facturing industry, and 
(ii) total payments by the U. K. motor vehicle 
manufacturing industry for "non-industrial 
services" (including the rent on buildings, 
hire of plant, bank charges, and advertising 
costs), motor vehicle licensing, rates (but 
excluding water rates), and salaries 
(defined as the wages and salaries of admin- 
istrative, clerical, and technical employees). 
This method of calculating "other fixed costs" is based 
upon the view that fixed costs are proportional to a firm's 
total number of employees; it is clearly a very crude ap- 
proximation. 
The reported values of on in Table 4 are given by the 
ratio, for each company respectively, of gross pretax profit, 
interest payments, and "other fixed costs" to the total 
turnover of all"four companies. 
The evidence in Table 4 suggests that errors in estimat- 
ing on for Leyland and Ford will be the most important 
determinant of errors in estimating u- for Chrysler and 
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TABLE 4. APPROXIMATIONS TO 0 
n, u, 
AND e"100 FOR THE U. K. 
NEW CAR INDUSTRY, 1975-1978. 
YEAR 
0 
n 
u c. 100 CHRYSLER FORD GENERAL LEYLAND 
MOTORS 
1975 0.005 0.044 0.014 0.072 0.135 1.84 
1976 0.001 0.059 0.013 0.092 0.165 6.10 
1977 0.006 0.073 0.011 0.077 0.167 14.84 
1978 0.008 0.069 0.014 0.079 0.170 19.85 
Source: compiled from EXTEL and Census of Production data 
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General Motors, the estimate of 0n is small throughout the 
period considered. Together with the information in Table 3, 
this implies that the Lyons (1981a) analysis would provide 
fairly accurate estimates of u in 1975, when an"100 is zero 
and 0.2 for Leyland and Ford respectively, but-that the 
analysis would cause increasingly significant underestima- 
tion throughout the remaining years considered., Values of 
an"100 of 4.2 and 35.2 for Leyland and Ford respectively 
in 1978 suggest that the underestimation in that year could 
be very large. 
This is as firm a conclusion as can confidently be 
reached using the available data, because estimates of any 
bias are themselves liable to significant error. Neverthe- 
less, estimates of e"100 calculated from the approximations 
to On are also given in Table 4, and reflect the conclusions 
drawn in the previous paragraph. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
It is clear that the phenomenon of intra-firm imports 
is an important influence on the degree of monopoly in 
certain industries at certain times. This paper provides 
a framework for analysing the phenomenon. Moreover, as indi- 
cated in Section 4, an identical framework can be used to 
accommodate intra-firm exports. 
A characteristic of the analysis highlighted earlier 
and requiring emphasis is that when imports by importing 
TNC's are insignificant, equation (2) effectively reduces 
to the relationship presented in Lyons (1981a). Given that 
the Lyons (1981a) analysis leads to considerable under- 
estimates of u when imports by importing TNC's are signif- 
icant, there is nothing to lose and much to gain from incor- 
porating intra-firm imports into the model. 
Equally as important is the demonstration in Section 5 
that a rise in an industry's import penetration can be 
accompanied by a rise in its degree of monopoly. 
This is not to claim that the model presented in this 
paper is an adequate framework for explaining the intra- 
firm trade phenomenon in all cases. In particular, further 
work is needed to understand long run conditions more fully, 
and an analysis of differentiated products may, in some 
instances, yield more fruitful conclusions. and greater under- 
standing. For example, in an industry of differentiated 
products, the requirement that full capacity working be 
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observed somewhere in the importing TNC's empire is unlikely 
to apply. Despite these qualifications, the model is a 
reasonable starting point. 
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'A TTT11T r%r 
Suppose N firms are engaged in domestic production. 
The behaviour of the typical firm, firm n, is given by 
equation (1), which implies: 
C=f (Q) +Q. 
df (Q) 
, 
dQ (A1) 
nn dQ dQn 
Following Cowling and Waterson (1976), 
dQ dQ G dM 
dQ =1+ dQ +I dQ 
(A2) 
n g3in n g=1 n 
where rig is the imports by the gth overseas corporation, 
g=1,2,....., G. 
Similarly to Clarke and Davies (1982) and Dixit and 
Stern (1982), define: 
dQ 4n 
d4 .Q= the elasticicity of domestic producer nq nq 
q's total domestic sales with respect 
to a change in domestic producer n's 
total domestic sales, as perceived by n. 
dM 
g 
4n 
= Yng dQn Mg the elasticity of overseas producer 
g's total domestic sales with respect 
to a change in domestic producer n's 
total domestic sales, as perceived by n. 
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G 
ß [4/Q]+1Y "[Mg/QI 
gin 
nq qn g_1 
ng gn 
an G 
14 /Qn+ I Mg/4n 
qon g q=1 
_ firm n's (weighted average) conjectural elasticity. 
Substituting an in equation (Al) and rearranging yields 
an expression for firm n's price cost margin: 
f (Q) -Cn 1 
f (4) "n" 
[sn+an "[ 1-s n1 
] (A3) 
where: 
TI 
dQ i(Q) the absolute value of, the industry's df(Q) Q 
domestic price elasticity of demand. 
sn 
Qn 
firm n's total share in total 
domestic sales. 
Define: 
N 
D- total domestic sales from domestic production Dn 
n=1 
do Dn = 
firm n's share in domestic sales from domestic 
production. 
Then, multiplying both sides of equation (A3) by do and re- 
arranging, an expression for a weighted average price cost 
margin is obtained: 
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NN N f(Q)-Cn Dn d "s +a "d "[1-s ] 
f (Q) Dn n=1 nn n=1 nnn 
(A4 
n=1 
I. e. 
ur a+ 
(1-al I do , Sn (AS) nnn n=1 
where: 
N 
I dn"[1-sn]"an 
a n-1N - the industry's (weighted average) 
nI1dn"[1-s n] conjectural elasticity. 
From the definition of Qn and Q given in Section 2, sn 
can also be written: 
1Dn+Mn D+MTNC 
Sn LD+MTNCJ D+M (A6 ) 
where Mn is zero for all but importing TNC's, and where: 
N 
- total imports by importing TNC's IM MTNC 
n=1 n 
M= total imports. 
Thus, from (A5) and (M), 
u_a+ 
[1-a] 
,r 
D+MTNC 
nn D+M 
(A7) 
where 
ND 
T= 
nl 
Dn " 
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1Dn+Mn 
D+MTNC (A8) 
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NOTES 
1) See, for example, Milliband (1969). 
2) See Helleiner and Lavergne (1979). 
3) It is assumed throughout the analysis that inventories 
are zero. 
4) As will become clear, there is nothing to be gained, 
from the viewpoint of this paper, by examining the 
activities of overseas corporations in more detail. 
N 
5) In defining MTNC as X Mn, note that Mn is zero for all 
but importing TNC's. n=1 
6) Cowling (1982a) in fact refers to total conjectural 
variations rather than conjectural elasticities when 
discussing international trade. 
0 
7) This conclusion requires a<1. Joint profit maximisation, 
which gives an upper bound to price-cost margins, requires 
an=1Vn, and thus a=1; see Cowling (1982a). Thus, this 
conclusion is valid for all but the joint profit maxi- 
mising solution, when changes in imports have no effect 
whatsoever, unless they cause a change in n. 
8) Throughout this analysis, small domestic producers, such 
as Reliant, are ignored, but in 1978, for example, their 
combined share in domestic output for domestic sale was 
approximately 0.5%, and thus their omission will not 
cause a significant bias. 
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PAPER TWO 
THE ANALYSIS OF INDUSTRY EQUILIBRIUM: 
A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE* 
*Warwick Economic Research Paper, Number 233, July 1983 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this paper is to consider the way in which 
industry equilibrium is analysed and, in particular, to 
explore the role of collusion. Its purpose is to establish 
a'theoretical perspective for the analysis of industry 
equilibrium. It is assumed that, in equilibrium, firms 
maximise short run profits; short run implies that cost and 
demand functions, and the number of rivals, are given. --- 
Section 2 uses a duopoly example to discuss the conjec- 
tural variation (cv) model of industry equilibrium. Three 
responses-are considered to Fellner's (1960)1) criticism 
that the model does not allow firms to change their conjec- 
tures when they are clearly wrong. The conclusion reached 
is that a cv model can only be used to describe equilibrium, 
but that it says little about the determinants of equilib- 
rium. The implication is a need to examine more closely 
the behaviour underlying firms' actions. This is the 
concern of Section 3. Collusion amongst firms focusing on 
the possibility of joint profit maximisation is brought to 
the centre of the analysis. It is suggested that industry 
equilibrium be analysed in terms of its deviation from 
the joint profit maximum, the deviation depending upon 
firms' retaliatory power, cost functions and demand 
functions. This is illustrated by considering the formal 
specification of a firm's price-cost margin. Finally, 
Section 4 concludes the paper. 
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2. CONJECTURAL VARIATION 
.A great 
deal of work has characterised industry 
equilibrium using the cv concept. 
2) 
The typical analysis 
can easily be illustrated by considering a duopoly which 
producesa. homogeneous good. Define:. Q firm i's sales; 
3) 
ci = firm i's (constant) marginal costs; Fi = firm i's 
fixed costs. Suppose the industry faces a linear inverse 
market demand function: p =, a-b(Q1+Q2) where a, b. > O. 
Firm. l's profits are then given: 
Tr i= [a-b(Q1+Q2)]Q1 - c1Q1 - F1 (1) 
Given that firm 1 maximises its profit, it is argued that 
d it produces where lrl/dQ1 = 0, i. e. where: 
a-b (Q1+Q2) + Q1(-b) (1+A1) - C1 =0 (2) 
aZ is firm l's cv, the amount by which the firm conjectures 
its rival's output will alter in response to a marginal 
change in Ql. That is, al is firm l's conjecture regarding 
the value of 
dQ2/dQl. 
This cv model can be interpreted by rearranging (2) 
to obtain firm its reaction function: 
a- cl Q2 (3) 41 
b(2+a1) (2+a1) 
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Thus, given a, b, cl, and A1, equation (3) plots firm l's 
profit maximising output as a function of firm 2's output. 
In Figure 1, (3) is plotted as R1. Similarly, a reaction 
function can be obtained for firm 2, and this is plotted 
as R2. RI and R2 describe the duopolists behaviour at all 
times. For example, if firm 1 produces OA, firm 2 will 
choose an output of AB. In reply, firm 1 cuts production 
to OC, precipitating a rise in Q2 to CE. This continues 
until the industry reaches equilibrium 
4) 
- point F in 
Figure L. At F, neither firm, given its rival's sales, 
desires to change its output level. 
Insofar, as Xi is firm i's. conjecture regarding the 
actual response of its rival, Fellner (1960) has made a 
valid and damning criticism of this analysis. 
5) Consider 
again the movement towards F. In response to firm 2 
producing AB, firm 1, taking account of its rival's 
reaction, chooses to produce CC. But then firm 2 alters 
its output level and causes firm 1 to make further changes. 
This clearly indicates to firm 1 that its original cv is 
wrong and should be altered, yet the model does not allow 
this to happen. 
There are at least three responses to such criticism. 
Each will be considered in turn. 
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FIGURE 1.: REACTION FUNCTIONS IN A CV MODEL OF DUOPOLY 
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(i) The first is to require consistent conjectures. That- 
is to require that, at least in the neighbourhood of 
equilibrium, firm i's conjecture coincides with the way 
its rival in fact reacts; see Kamien and Schwartz (1983), 
Perry (1982), and Ulph (1983). Consider firm 2 in the 
duopoly example. Its rival's output is given by equation (3). 
Thus, its rival's reaction to a marginal change in Q2 is 
given by 
dQl/dQ2 
calculated from equation (3), implying: 
1 
Similarly, 
__ 
(5) x1 1- 2+A2 
Kamien and Schwartz (1983) examine the case where X Al=X2. 
From (4) or (5), this requires: 
2+a =a => 
(X+1) 2=0 => 7l = -1 
From equation (2), a=-1 means that price equals marginal 
cost, 
6) i. e. the firms behave as though they are in a 
perfectly competitive situation. 
Whilst the consistent conjectures approach is 
initially appealing, Kamien and Schwartz's (1983) example 
shows its failure to correctly analyse industry equilibrium. 
Requiring symmetric duopolists facing a linear inverse 
- 66 - 
market demand function to price at marginal cost is wrong. 
7 
For instance, ignoring legal constraints - reasonable in 
the context of these theoretical models - it is undoubtedly 
possible for the firmsto formally agree to maximise joint 
profits and therefore price above marginal cost. The 
importance of this possibility will be pursued in more 
detail later; suffice it here to note that joint profit 
maximisation is a feasible equilibrium. Thus, the problem 
with an analysis based upon. consistent conjectures is that 
other factors need to be analysed to discover whether or 
not its conclusions are valid. 
(ii) The second possible response is to argue that equations 
like (2) hold only when the industry is in equilibrium. 
Equilibrium implies that no firm wishes to change its out- 
put, given the production of rivals, and thus, from the 
profit maximising assumption, that equation (2) holds. 
However, there is nothing to suggest that the same equation 
also holds in disequilibrium. Rearranging to give (3) does 
not yield a function which can be plotted in Q1, Q2 space, 
and therefore does not produce a reaction function from 
which to calculate conjectural variations. 
This is an improvement on the consistent conjectures 
response because it does not rule out feasible equilibria. 
But simply to argue that equation (2) is valid only in 
equilibrium is merely to describe equilibrium, and is 
to say Ilittle about why an acutal equilibrium arises - 
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i. e. little about the factors which cause an equilibrium 
to arise, either in a dynamic or static context. Thus, 
whereas it is clear that it is not determined by a set 
of simple reaction functions, it is not clear what it is 
determined by. 
(iii) The third response is illustrated by Clarke (1982). 
Consider again the symmetric firms example of Kamien and 
Schwartz (1983). Whilst it is true that A>-1 appears 
myopic - in disequilibrium, firm i's conjecture will not 
equal its rival's actual response - this charge., misses 
the point because it. is in the combined interests of the 
firms to adopt these conjectures and thus increase joint 
profits. That is,, Xi is not firm i's conjecture regarding 
the actual response in the sense discussed by Fellner (1960). 
But the crucial question remains: why should firms 
seek to increase combined,. profits? Moreover, if combined 
profits are so vital, how can Clarke contemplate any out- 
come other than joint profit maximisation? In short, this 
response suffers from the same problem as (ii); it is not 
clear why an actual equilibrium arises. 
The conclusion to be drawn from (i)-(iii) is: whereas 
a cv model can be used to describe equilibrium, it says 
little about the factors which determine equilibrium. This 
implies that an analysis of the determinants of equilibrium 
needs to examine more closely the behaviour underlying 
a firm's actions. 
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Where should this examination begin? Stigler (1968) 
suggests that a basic problem with cv models is that behaviour 
is'postulated, rather than deduced from the profit maximisa- 
tion assumption. That is, Stigler argues that 
"profit maximising must imply the form of behaviour - 
economic behaviour is a means to achieve this end, 
not a separate part of man to be supplied by a 
psychiatrist or a sociologist. " (p. 36) 
Such reasoning underlies the criticism of consistent 
conjectures raised earlier in this Section - i. e. that 
they cannot accommodateaauilibria which profit maximisa- 
tion implies are feasible. Moreover, this suggests a 
starting point for an alternative analysis, namely: it 
is wrong to conclude that the only feasible equilibrium 
requires zero price-cost margins when there is a possibil- 
ity of explicit collusion. It is to this analysis that 
the following Section turns. 
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3. COLLUSION 
It was assumed at the outset of this paper that the 
driving force behind a firm's activities is the maximisa- 
tion of its own profits. If a firm operates in a perfectly 
competitive product market, it receives normal profits. 
Clearly, pursuit of maximum profits implies that a firm 
will attempt to get away from a perfectly competitive 
environment and dominate its product market. The vital 
question is: can it? 
A possibility 
8 is for firms to assume an attitude 
of live and let live towards each other, i. e. for firms to 
collude. For example, in an industry comprising two symmetric 
firms selling an identical product at constant marginal 
cost, rather than engaging in blind competition that pushes 
product price down to the perfectly competitive level, the 
firms are likely to realise that, if they tolerate each 
other's prescence, both can obtain above normal profits. 
Baran and Sweezy (1966) make this point: 
"The typical giant corporation ... is one of several 
corporations producing commodities which are more or 
less substitutes for each other. When one of them 
varies its price, the effect will immediately be felt 
by the others. 
If firm A lowers its price, some new demand will be tapped, 
but the main effect will be to attract customers away from 
firms B, C and D. The latter, not willing to give up their 
business to A, will retaliate by lowering their prices, 
perhaps even undercutting A. While A's original move was 
made in the expectation of increasing its profit, the net 
result may be to leave all the firms in a worse position. 
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Unstable market situations of this sort were very 
common in the earlier phases of monopoly capitalism, 
and still occur from time to time, but they are not 
typical of present-day monopoly capitalism. And clearly 
they are anathema to the big corporations with their 
penchant for looking ahead, planning carefully, and 
betting only on the sure thing. To avoid such situations 
therefore becomes the first concern of corporate policy, 
the sine qua non of orderly'and profitable business 
operation. (p. 67) 
Recognition of their interdependence causes firms to collude, 
i. e. not to behave such that all firms in the industry 
become worse off. 
Similarly, Scherer (1980) observes: 
"When the number of sellers. is small, each, firm 
recognises that aggressive' action such as price 
cutting will induce counteractions from rivals which, 
in the end, leave all members of the industry worse 
off. All may therefore exercise mutual restraint and 
prevent prices from falling to the competitive level. " 
(p. 514) 
Although Baran and Sweezy (1966) refer to giant corpora- 
tions, and Scherer (1980) to industries with a small number 
of sellers, -it. is particularly important to note that 
recognition of interdependence, and thus the existence of 
collusion, is not confined simply to industries comprising 
a few firms. Indeed, Phillips (1962) points out: "Inter- 
dependence may involve but a few firms or it may include 
thousands" (p. 29). By definition, an industry, comprises 
firms producing goods which are substitutes for each other. 
Interdependence therefore spreads throughout the industry. 
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There is no reason to expect firms to fail to recognise 
9) 
this fact. 
What is the importance of collusion in establishing 
the set of feasible equilibria? As a starting point, it 
is at least possible to restrict the possibilities by 
considering four propositions: 
10 
(i) For profit maximisers, the polar extreme to a perfectly 
competitive industry is joint maximisation. This is true by 
definition of perfect competition and the joint maximum. 
(ii) If all firms in an industry seek to do so, they will 
be able to maximise joint profits. The only real difficulty 
could be with firms communicating their views to each other; 
see, for example, Phillips (1962). However, there are a 
number of factors discussed by Scherer (1980)11) which 
facilitate communication, for instance: 
(a) in the absence of legal constraints, overt 
meetings between firms. 
(b) social gatherings amongst firms' representatives. 
(c) informal trade association meetings. 
(d) collusive price leadership, i. e. the "dominant" 
firm leads its "followers" towards the joint 
maximum. 
(e) centralised information gathering networks. 
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It is reasonable to conclude that if the firms wish to 
communicate, they will find the means to, do so. Nevertheless, 
it could be argued that the costs of communication may be 
so exhorbitant as to render it unprofitable. However, at 
least in many industries, this is unlikely. For instance, 
the cost of social gatherings is likely to be very small 
compared to the profits attainable at the joint maximum. ' 
Moreover, as a starting point, it is reasonable to ignore 
such costs. This does not deny that, in a more sophisticated 
analysis, the problem posed by communication deserves more 
detailed treatment. For example, the influence of the number 
of firms may"prove--important, and insights may be obtained 
from analysing a trade-off at the margin between the costs 
and benefits - in the form of increased profits - of 
communication. However, such considerations do not under- 
mine the purpose of this paper. 
(iii) A firm will seek joint profit maximisation when 
it believes it cannot obtain higher profits by some other 
means. This follows from the profit maximising assumption. 
(iv)- If a firm seeks joint profit maximisation, because 
its profits are less than at the joint maximum, it does not 
thereby run a risk that it can be made even worse off. In 
particular, a firm seeking joint maximisation does not 
provide rivals with information about its iso-profit map 
12) 
that can lead to its being made even worse off; the exact 
meaning of this statement should become clearer after the 
discussion of "response power", the issue involved, later 
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in this paper. However, as will also become clear, 
verifying-the assumption's feasibility involves complex 
issues - in short, a more detailed analysis of collusion 
than has thus far been attempted - and it will not be 
pursued here. Nevertheless, the notion that a firm can 
simply tell its rivals that it would rather maximise joint 
profits, and not thereby suffer, does seem at least a not 
unreasonable starting point for an analysis. 
Given (i) - (iv), then: if joint profits are not being 
maximised in an industry, it must be because at least one 
firm believes it. is obtaining higher profits than it would 
receive at the joint maximum. That is, given the feasibility 
of joint maximisation, firms will collude to avoid situations 
in which they are all worse off than at the joint maximum. 
The implications of this conclusion can be illustrated 
using a duopoly example. 
Suppose each firm produces a homogeneous good and 
faces identical variable cost functions. It seems reasonable 
to assume that each firm's assessment of the output levels 
maximising joint profits will coincide; this merely 
requires that each firm realises output is homogeneous 
and cost functions are identical. Then, the shaded area 
in Figure 2 depicts the set of feasible equilibria implied 
by (i) - (iv). J is the firms' assessment of the joint 
maximum, and , rJ is firm h's iso-profit contour for the 
h 
level of profits it obtains at J: - h=1,2. J is on the 
450 line because of the symmetric 'output and cost assumptions. 
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FIGURE 2: THE SET OF FEASIBLE EQUILIBRIA IN_A 
SYMMETRIC DUOPOLY 
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At any point within irh , firm h's profits are greater and 
firm k's profits less than those at J: - h 76 k. 
This is in stark contrast to the consistent conjectures 
example in Kamien and Schwartz (1983). No matter where 
industry equilibrium is within the shaded area, at least 
one firm is obtaining at least the profits it would receive 
at the joint maximum. If marginal costs are constant - as 
Kamien and Schwartz assume - price must be higher than 
marginal cost. Moreover, Figure 2 shows that the only 
feasible equilibrium in which Q1 = Q2 is J. This rules out, 
for instance, the possibility of a Cournot equilibrium.. 
Such an outcome is not obvious in a bald cv model. 
So much for the set of feasible equilibria. How can the 
actual equilibrium be analysed? The vital factor is-the 
existence of collusion amongst firms recognising the 
possibility of joint profit maximisation. Consider, for 
13) 
example, the analysis of feasible equilibria based on 
propositions (i) - (iv). In particular, consider the case 
where an industry is in an equilibrium which is not the joint 
profit maximum. Define ni as firm i's profits at the 
equilibrium, and ii as the profits i believes it would 
get at the joint maximum. For at least one firm, for 
example, firm h, rh > ýh . This follows from the fact that 
all industries collude at least to the extent that no 
industry will be in equilibrium at a point where all firms 
believe they would be better off maximising joint profits. 
However, it is also generally14) true that for at least 
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one firm, for example firm k, nk < 7r k. This follows 
from the definition of a joint maximum. The reason the 
industry is not maximising joint profits is that firm k 
1 
does. not possess the retalitory power5ý to force firm h 
into a position where it too would prefer joint maximisa- 
tion. If firm k did possess the retaliatory power, the 
firms would collude to maximise joint profits; i. e. the 
firms would avoid any behaviour which moved the industry 
from the joint maximum because the outcome would leave all 
worse off. 
This suggests that an actual equilibrium can be analysed 
in terms of its deviation from the joint maximum, the devia- 
tion depending upon the retaliatory power of firms. The 
concept of retaliatory power is complex. However, its 
crucial importance makes it worthwhile examining some of 
its general characteristics. 
There are two critical determinants of a firm's 
retaliatory power, namely the firm's ability to 
(i) detect activity by rivals which leads to the latter 
gaining at the firm's expense, and to 
(ii) respond to such activity by inflicting damage, in 
the form of decreased profits, on those rivals. 
These can be referred to, respectively, as'a firm's 
detection power and response power. 
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The importance of detection power is seen most clearly 
by considering an extreme case: if firm i cannot detect 
at all the activity by its rivals which leads the latter 
to gain at the firm's expense, the firm will not retaliate 
to the activity. No matter what a firm's response power, 
zero detection power implies zero retaliatory power. More 
generally, the lower is detection power the lower is 
retaliatory power. 
A number of analyses have studied the determinants 
1 
of detection power. 
6 
Particularly influential has been 
Stigler's (1964) suggestion that it is an increasing 
function of an industry's Herfindahl index of sales 
concentration. However, it is necessary to emphasise that, 
collectively, firms can agree on measures which improve 
their detection powers. For example, firms could publish 
the prices at which they trade; or they could use more 
sophisticated devices, such as sales contract clauses which 
allow a seller the option of meeting any lower prices 
which a buyer may be offered. See Salop (1982). Thus, 
detection power is, at least to some extent, determined 
by firms' actions; it is not merely a function of market 
characteristics like concentration. 
Why is this worth emphasising? It was argued earlier 
that, if an industy is not at the joint maximum, it is 
because at least one firm does not possess the retaliatory 
power to force its rivals to that point. Suppose an industry 
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is observed in which all firms, for instance, publish 
their trading prices. There is at least a suggestion that, 
if each firm has a significant response power, the industry 
is maximising joint profits. Certainly, those firms which 
would gain by being away from the joint maximum would not 
unnecessarily increase the loosers' retaliatory power. Put 
another way, in such an industry the deviation of the 
equilibrium from the joint maximum is determined entirely 
by response power. 
The importance of response power is shown in particular 
by Osborne (1976) and Holohan (1978). Consider, for example, 
the duopoly characterised in Figure 3, where J is the 
joint profit maximum. Assume the industry is initially at 
J but that firm 2 contemplates increasing its output to 
Q2 . Suppose there are no detection problems for firm 1. 
If firm 1 would respond to Q2 = Q2 by increasing its out- 
' 
put beyond Ql , firm 2 will not attempt to move to point A. 
The reason is that 2 would obtain greater profits-by 
remaining at J. The crucial question is : would firm 1 
respond in this way ? Clearly, if Q1 > Ql implies firm l's 
profits exceed those it would obtain at A, it is unlikely 
to remain at A. Problems arise when Q1 > Ql implies less 
profits than at A. 
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FIGURE 3: THE IMPORTANCE OF RESPONSE POWER 
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In reality, firms will play a game of bluff and 
counter-bluff. Firm 2 will be uncertain17 whether or not 
its rival will obtain higher or lower profits when Q1 ' Q1. 
Thus, a threat by 1 to push the industry north of B may 
be credible even though in fact firm 1 would become 
worse off than at A. Indeed, firm 1 may actually increase 
its output beyond Q1 even though it is worse off than at A, 
if it believes this will push its rival back to J suffi- 
ciently quickly. This illustrates the importance of getting 
away from the simple reaction function approach that char- 
acterises the consistent conjectures interpretation of a 
cv model. 
18 
Again, there are various studies of the determinants 
19) 
of response power. Especially important - as seen from 
Figure 3- is that, for example, firm 1 has the plant 
capacity to increase output beyond Ql ; this is explored 
in, for instance, Cowling's (1982) analysis of excess 
capacity. However, it is essential to emphasise a point 
which is easily forgotten and often ignored, namely: in 
a world characterised by multimarket enterprises - i. e. 
firms that sell and/or produce in a number of markets - it 
is wrong to analyse individual markets in isolation. 
Edwards (1979) notes, as regards so-called "powerful 
enterprises": 
"The chief danger to competition from such enterprises 
is still conceived as the danger that one of them will 
try to obtain, or succeed in obtaining, the power of 
a monopoly in some particular market, or that, in a 
particular market, a few of them may obtain oligopoly 
power. Although competition sometimes is impaired in 
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these ways, I think that the chief and growing danger 
is that competition will be eroded by uses of power 
that transcend particular markets. " (p. 285, emphasis 
added. 
He goes on: 
"When powerful enterprises have reiterated contacts 
that each considers important, each is likely to 
decide what it should do in such contacts by considering 
what would be best for the enterprise as a whole. Each 
is likely to modify conduct that would be its adjustment 
to the contact in a particular market after considering 
the effect of that conduct upon its relationships with 
the same enterprise in the other markets in which it 
encounters that enterprise. " (p. 294) 
Suppose, for example, that firms 1 and 2 sell their 
output in markets X and Y. If firm 1 contemplates any 
activity causing it to gain at 2's expense in market x, 
it will consider firm 2's response in markets X and Y. 
That is, firms 2's response power in each market is given 
by its ability to inflict damage on rivals in all markets 
in which they have contact. Moreover, even if the firms 
only sell their output in market X, if they have production 
facilities in various markets they can use output from 
any of these facilities to inflict damage on rivals. 
However, retaliatory power is only part of the story 
that analyses actual industry equilibrium. Consider again 
firm h. The set of output combinations within the iso-profit 
contour nh will be classified by h according to the 
profit they yield. If its rivals' retaliatory power leaves 
h any choice over its output, the choice will be made 
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using this classification, which is determined by h's 
cost and demand functions. For example, consider a duopoly 
in which firm 2's output is fixed at Q2 . 
20) Thus, firm 2 
has no retaliatory power. Suppose joint profits are 
maximised when Q1 = Q1 . This is depicted in Figure 4, 
where the vertical line through Q. represents the set of 
feasible equilibria. Firm 1 can choose any point on this 
vertical line; no matter what output firm 1 chooses, firm 2 
cannot retaliate to force 1 to J because it has no options 
available. What will firm 1 produce? Firm 1 will choose 
the output which, given Q1 = QE , maximises its profit. 
For instance, in the duopoly illustration of Section 2, 
from equation 3, firm 1 chooses the output given by: 
a- cl 
_ 
Q2 
Q1 
2b 2 
where: cl is firm l's marginal production costs, and a 
and b are the inverse market demand function parameters. 
In contrast21) 
Ja- cl 
_E 41 2b Q2 
Thus, an actual equilibrium can be analysed in terms 
of its deviation from the joint profit maximum, the devia- 
tion depending upon the firms' retaliatory power, cost 
functions, and demand functions, Consider, for example, 
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an industry of N firms producing a homogeneous good. Firm 
i's price-cost margin at the joint maximum is 
p- ci (4i) 1 
- 
p 
n:. 
i=1,2,....., N (6) 
where: p is the product price, ci(Q1) firm i's marginal 
cost function, and nX the absolute value of the industry's 
elasticity of demand. More generally, i's price-cost margin 
can be represented: 
22) 
p- ci (Qi) 
p=ß , 
ý:. 
where: 
1,2,...., N (7) 
ß ß(r l, r2, .... rN; Cl, C2, .., CN; f(Q)). 
r = the retaliatory power of firm i. i 
Ci the total cost function of firm i. 
23) 
f(Q)=- the industry's inverse-market demand function. 
Q= Q1 + Q2 + ... + QN . 
It is revealing to compare (7) with the result given 
by a cv framework in the simplified case where the 
inverse market demand function has constant elasticity. 
(It was recognised in Section 2 that a cv model can 
reasonably be used to describe equilibrium. ) Following 
cowling and Waterson (1976), 
24) 
such a model yields an 
expression for firm i's price-cost margin: 
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p- ci (. Qi) 
_ 
(1 + Ai) Qi, 
PQn:: 
;i=1,2, ..., N (8) 
Whereas equation (3) raight be used to suggest that structure, 
in the form of market share, is a determinant peter se of 
the equilibrium price-cost margin, it is clear from 
equation (7) that its only influence can be via the 
arguments of ß("). This underlines the view that, when 
used tö describe equilibrium, the cv model is silent 
on the determinants of equilibrium. 
25) 
Similarly, it is 
clear from (7) that, given n:: is a function of f (Q) , 
market demand characteristics influence n--' and ß("). In 
contrast, it is not as obvious from equation '(8) that 
the interrelationships between n-', ', Qi/Q', and ai will be 
recognised. This is because, unlike equation (8), equa- 
tion (7) focuses upon the determinants of equilibrium. 
Such considerations are amplified in the case where the 
inverse market demand function does not have constant 
elasticity, in which case n-- in equation (8) is simply 
the elasticity in equilibrium. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
It is clear from equation (7) that the analysis 
of industry equilibrium requires a detailed examination 
of functions like ß("). As it is, to state that equilibrium 
should be analysed in terms of its deviation from the joint 
profit maximum, the deviation depending upon ß("), is 
merely to state the problem. It remains to examine the 
problem in greater detail. For example, exactly what 
influence do ri, Ci, and f(Q) have within ß(")? What are 
the determinants of ri ? How important are fixed costs? 
What are the critical demand function parameters? 
However, this involves many complex issues. These 
will not be pursued here - important though they undoubtedly 
are - because enough has already been commented upon to 
serve this paper's purpose. 
Thus, the crucial argument is that collusion amongst 
firms focusing upon the possibility of joint profit max- 
imisation is given the centre stage. As a result, the 
determinants of equilibrium are brought to the fore and, 
for example, it is possible to analyse the determinants 
of a firms price-cost margin. This is a considerable improve- 
ment on the cv model, which, in its consistent conjectures 
form, for example, suggests conclusions that an appreciation 
of the possibilities for collusion show to be erroneous. 
Nevertheless, further development of this theoretical 
perspective must await subsequent study. 
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NOTES 
1) The influence of Fellner (1960) can be, seen throughout 
this paper. 
2) See, for example, Sawyer (1979). 
3) Inventories are ignored throughout the analysis. 
4) Although Figure 1 depicts a stable equilibrium, 
Fellner (1960) points out that the position of the 
reaction functions need not give this result. 
5) Stigler (1968) also notes this criticism. 
6) This implies c- c1 = c2 . 
7) Moreover, the case cited in the text is only an 
illustration. Kamien and Schwartz (1983) show that in 
a symmetric duopoly - i. e. both firms have identical 
costs, conjectures, and output levels - where profit 
maximising first order conditions are used to model 
firm behaviour, consistent conjectures yields positive 
price - cost margins only with a limited set of 
inverse market demand functions. 
8) Other possibilities are the search for differentiated 
products, and for advantageous cost functions. All of 
these issues are inextricably bound up with entry 
barrier problems. In this paper, however, market 
demand functions, cost functions, and the number of 
firms are all taken as given. More generally, see 
Paper Three. 
9) Scherer (1980) disagrees with this view, but does not 
give a reason. - 
10) The idea here is that, beginning with all possible 
output combinations across firms as the set of 
feasible equilibria, consideration of four proposi- 
tions leads to a restriction of this set. This is not 
to deny that the set of feasible equilibria may be 
restricted by other means in a more detailed analysis. 
11) Scherer (1980), chapter 6. 
12) See, for example, Dixit (1979) for an examination of 
iso-profit contours. 
13) The analysis that follows relies essentially upon 
collusion, not simply collusion as depicted using 
propositions (i) - (iv). That is, if a more detailed 
study leads to the set of feasible equilibria being 
restricted by other means, it would not undermine 
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the analysis that follows. Moreover, the latter 
raises issues - e. g. retaliatory power - which, 
examined in detail, may lead to the set of feasible 
equilibria being restricted other than by using 
propositions (i) - (iv). 
14) It could be that firms disagree over their assessment 
of the joint maximum and all see themselves as better 
off in the actual equilibrium. 
15) Consider again the views of Baran and Sweezy (1966), 
quoted earlier in the paper. 
16) See Scherer (1980), chapters 6 and 7, for a review. 
17) Uncertainty is also important vis-a-vis detection 
power. See Cubbin (1983). 
18)_ It also illustrates the way in which proposition (iv) 
in the earlier discussion of the set of feasible 
equilibria is essentially a problem of response 
power. 
19) See Scherer (1980), chapter 7, for a review. 
20) Whilst this is clearly unrealistic, it nevertheless 
illustrates the point in issue. 
21) Thus, joint profits w, are given: 
Tr = [a-b(Q1+Q2) 3 (Q1+Q2) - c1Q1 - c2Q2 
- F1 - F2 
Maximising with respect to Q1 requires: 
E E' 
a- b(Q1+Q2) + (Q1+Q2) (-b) - c1 =0 
Thus, 
a-cl QE 41 
2b -2 
22) Note that, insofar as industry elasticity is a 
meaningful concept in such a case, equation (7) 
is also valid for a differentiated goods industry. 
23) The potential importance of fixed costs is implied 
by Dixit (1979). 
24) See also Paper One. 
25) See also Clarke and Davies (1982). 
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PART THREE 
THE THEORY OF THE FIRM 
-90 - 
It is especially clear from Paper one that an analysis 
of transnational monopoly capitalism requires a detailed 
examination of the theory of the firm. 
For example, the model of production outlined in 
Section 2 of Paper One noted that not all firms need be 
transnational corporations perhaps because all do not have 
access to cheap labour, or because of government inter- 
ference, or because of heterogeneous management quality. 
The question being raised here is: why are there trans- 
national corporations? 
Answering this question is the concern of Paper 
Three. Having noted that the question "why transnational 
corporations? " needs to be considered within the more 
general context of the question "why firms? ", two approaches 
to the latter are contrasted, namely: internalisation 
analysis, emphasising efficiency, and Marglin's study 
of the rise of the factory, emphasising distribution. 
The paper then pursues a Marglinian analysis. It 
develops a general theoretical framework based upon 
product market domination - drawing the analysis to the 
discussion of Paper Two - and takes up one aspect 
of this - labour market domination - in theoretical and 
empirical detail. Throughout, liberal use is made of 
footnotes to compare the analysis with others. 
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In an earlier version'of Paper Three, the analysis 
was based upon profit maximising managers controlling 
the firm. This was changed in the light of Paper Four, 
which examines the issue of owner versus manager control, 
and suggests that there has been no managerial revolution. 
Thus, Paper Four argues that the largely static, 
ahistorical existing literature on the theory of the firm 
is inadequate in its treatment of the control issue. It 
tends to classify firms as either owner or manager 
controlled using an ex post analysis of share distribution. 
In contrast, this paper reverses the direction of 
causality, explaining the control of firms in a dynamic, 
historical framework. It concludes that the observed 
distribution of shares will suffice to give a subset of 
owners control. The arguments are illustrated by a 
series of diagrams, and supported by an examination of 
recently reported empirical evidence. Consideration of the 
M-form organisation and savings behaviour are used to 
further discriminate the analysis from managerialism 
and neoclassicism respectively. 
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PAPER THREE 
WHY TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS? * 
*An earlier version of this paper appeared as Warwick 
Economic Research Paper, Number 222, February 1983, 
and was presented at the tenth annual conference of 
the European Association for Research in Industrial 
Economics (EARIE), Bergen, August 1983. Another earlier 
version was presented at the Annual Conference of the 
Academy of International Business, Bardford, April 1984. 
Final version of this paper completed July, 1984. 
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1. INTRODUCTION "- 
Consider a firm with production facilities in various- 
countries -a transnational corporation (TNC). Why are 
there TNC's? That is, supposing firm A initially-produces 
in country X, why should-it acquire production facilities 
in country Y, either where it initially produces only in X 
or where it initially produces in X and Y? 
1) This paper 
discusses various aspects of the latter problem. 
Briefly, the plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 
contrasts two approaches to the question "why firms? " 
namely: internalisation analysis, emphasising efficiency, 
and Marglin's study of the rise of the factory, emphasising 
distribution. -, Subsequent sections pursue a Marglinian ana- 
lysis. Section 3 develops a general theoretical framework 
based upon product market domination, and Section 4 takes 
up one aspect of this - labour market domination - in theo- 
retical and empirical detail. Finally, Section 5 concludes 
the paper with a short summary. Throughout, liberal use is 
made of footnotes to compare the analysis with others. 
2) 
The paper's originality is principally to formulate (at 
least the beginnings of) a Marglinian approach to "why 
TNC's? " This, for instance, is in stark contrast to the 
internalisation analysis dominating much contemporary 
thinking. In addition, and within this, two other aspects 
deserve emphasis. Firstly, whilst the paper draws upon a 
considerable body of existing literature, this is placed 
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within a product market domination framework absent else- 
where. Secondly, the detailed concern with labour market 
domination is new as regards the "why TNC's? " problem. The 
paper does not identify and give a priority ordering to all 
possible reasons for the existence of TNC's. Rather, it 
identifies sets of reasons to explain why there are TNC's, 
and pursues one reason in detail. 
2. "WHY FIRMS? " AS A FOUNDATION FOR "WHY TNC's? " 
Because it begins at the beginning, a reasonable start- 
ing point in answering the question "why TNC's? " is to con- 
sider the question "why firms? "; after all, a TNC is merely 
a specific breed of firm. This is the approach in Buckley 
3) 
and Casson (1976). It is worth outlining what they 
actually argue. 
- Firms are seen as a means for coordinating "interdepen- 
dent activities linked by flows of intermediate products" 
(p. 36). The issue "why firms? " really asks: why should 
interdependent activities be coordinated "internally" by a 
firm rather than by the alternative, namely "externally" by 
market forces? The answer is that internal coordination is 
used because of the incentives to bypass imperfect external, 
markets, i. e.: 
"It is well known to economists that under certain 
conditions... the coordination of interdependent 
activities by a complete set of perfectly competitive 
markets cannot be improved upon. An important 
corollary of this is that there is no advantage in 
replacing a perfect system of markets by a centrally 
administered control system. Thus the incentive for 
internal coordination of activities by a firm does not 
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rest on the advantages of centralisation per se ..... In fact, it is a consequence of the result above that a 
necessary condition for an internal market to be more 
efficient than an external one is that the external 
market is imperfect. 
The benefits of internalisation stem from 'the avoid- 
ance of imperfections in the external market, but there 
are also certain costs of internalisation which may 
affect the potential benefits. The optimal scale of 
the firm is set at the margin where costs and benefits 
of further internalisation are equalised. " (p. 36-37) 
Why, then, are there TNC's? A TNC "is created whenever 
markets are internalised across national boundaries" (p. 
45). Exactly when this is likely is explored in more 
detail by Buckley and Casson. 
4) However, this part of 
their analysis will not be examined here, because the con- 
cept of internalisation can be contrasted directly with an 
alternative, preferable foundation. 
Insofar as it goes, it is not wrong to view a firm as a 
means for coordinating interdependent activities linked by 
flows of intermediate products. Similarly, insofar as it 
goes, it is not wrong to argue that the raison d'etre of a 
firm is the net benefits arising from its existence. But 
such general statements do not go very far. They imme- 
diately suggest an important question: from whose viewpoint 
are the net benefits defined? The emphasis of the interna- 
lisation analysis is efficiency. An understanding of this 
concept gives an answer to the question. 
A situation in which no-one can be made better off 
without making someone else worse off is said to be "ef-. 
ficient". It is in this sense that a complete set of per- 
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fectly competitive markets cannot be improved upon. A sit- 
uation is said to be "more efficient" than an alternative 
if no individual is worse off and at least one is better 
off than in the alternative. Thus, the consequence that an 
internal market is only more efficient than an external one 
if the latter is imperfect is undoubtedly correct. But why 
is this important? The implication is that an internal 
market is in fact more efficient than an external market. 
Otherwise, it would not exist. 
This implication is crucial. ' The underlying reasoning 
can be shown by a simple example. Suppose individuals A 
and B are engaged in interdependent activities'within a 
firm. The argument typically runs: the fact that a firm 
exists implies that A and Bare better off - or at least, 
neither is worse off - using a firm organisation rather 
than an external market, otherwise they would have chosen 
to use the external market. That is, all participants in a 
firm receive non-negative benefits from internalisation. 
5) 
However, this argument assumes that the option of using 
the external market is available, and it says nothing about 
any other options. More generally, a second important 
question must be asked: what is the set of options over 
which a choice is made? The importance of this question is 
shown by Marglin's (1974)6) discussion of the rise of the 
factory in the English textile industry, 1750-1850. 
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Prior to the factory, production was organised by the 
"putting-out" system: a capitalist divided production into 
separate tasks, each being carried out by a worker in his 
own home at the pace he dictated. Under the factory 
system, the division of labour remained, but workers were 
brought under one roof and the capitalist dictated when and 
how much work was done. This control of the work process 
was the critical reason for the introduction of factories: 
as a result, capitalists could increase their profits by 
decreasing workers' utility. Efficiency was not in issue. 
By working in a factory, a worker revealed no preference 
for the factory system: 
"The question is not so much whether or not factory 
employment was better for workers than starving - let 
us grant that it was - but whether or not it was better 
than alternative forces of productive organisation that 
would have allowed the worker a measure of control of 
product and process, even at the cost of a lower level 
of output and earnings. But to grow and develop in 
nineteenth century Britain ..... such alternatives 
would have had to have been profitable for the organ- 
iser of production. Since worker control of product 
and process ultimately leaves no place for the capital- 
ist, it is hardly surprising that the development of 
capitalism .... did not create a long list of employ- 
ment opportunities in which workers displaced from the 
traditional occupation of their parents could control 
product and process. " (p. 37). 
That is, Marglin sees control of the firm as exercised in 
the interests of capitalists - who benefited from the 
factory - rather than the workers - whose utility fell with 
the introduction of the factory. Moreover, whereas the 
worker's option was whether or not to work at all, the cap- 
italist's was which form of organising production - be this 
use of the price mechanism (i. e. external organisation) or 
- 98 - 
one of the many possibilities for internal organisation - 
would benefit him the most. 
The concern of this paper is not the English textile 
industry, 1750-1850. However, Marglin's work has interest- 
ing implications for analysing TNC's. Particularly impor- 
tant is the need to focus in detail on the characteristics 
of a firm's activities. Put another way, real insight is 
obtained by focusing. in detail on the characteristics of a 
transaction (involving an intermediate product) executed 
within a firm. For example, why this transaction rather 
than another, internal or external? Moreover, as a result 
of this focus, Marglin (1974) emphasises distributional 
considerations, in direct contrast with the efficiency 
emphasis of internalisation; in short, the factory arose 
because it allowed capitalists to gain at workers' expense. 
This contrast is vital from a welfare standpoint. 
The remainder of this paper examines "why TNC's? " 
within this Marglinian framework, focusing in detail on the 
characteristics of a firm's activities, and emphasising 
distributional considerations. Firstly, a general analysis 
is presented. 
3.. A GENERAL THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
If a firm operates in a perfectly competitive product 
market, it receives normal profits. - Thus, assuming a firm 
seeks maximum profits, it will attempt to get away from a 
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perfectly competitive environment and obtain above normal 
profits. That is, it will try to dominate its product 
market and, in the limit, obtain-monopoly-profits. The 
crucial issue is: can it? If so, does this explain why 
some firms produce in various countries? In fact, it can, 
and this does have implications for the existence of'TNC's. 
Particularly vital in this respect is the possibility 
7 
of firms colluding, a concept'discussed as regardsTpri- 
cing by Baran and Sweezy (1966): 
"The typical giant corporation ... is one of several 
corporations producing commodities which are more or 
less adequate substitutes for each other. When one of 
them varies its price, the effect will be felt by the 
others. If firm A lowers its price, some new demand 
will be tapped, but the main effect will be to attract 
customers away from firms B, C and D. The latter, not 
willing to give up their business to A, will retaliate 
by lowering their prices, perhaps even undercutting A. 
While A's original move was made in the expectation of 
increasing its profit, the net result may be to leave 
all the firms in a worse position........ 
Unstable market situations of this sort .... are ana- thema to the big corporations .,.. To avoid such situa- 
tions therefore becomes the first concern of corporate 
policy .... " (p. 67). 
Thus, collusion derives from recognition of rival produ- 
cers' "retaliatory power": a firm accomodates its rivals' 
presence because it cannot drive them from the industry. 
If circumstances arise in which rivals can be driven out, a 
firm will not hesitate to become a pure monopolist. Like- 
wise, a firm will appreciate that rivals tolerate its pre- 
sence because they believe they cannot drive it from the 
industry. 
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. Bearing 
in mind this conceptualisation of a firm's. 
environment - namely: collusive behaviour existing, along- 
side and deriving from a ready willingness by each firm to 
drive rivals from the market; i. e. the coexistence of 
8 
rivalry and collusion - the literature on oligopolistic 
reaction and TNC's is of interest. Consider, for instance, 
Knickerbocker (1973). 9) Suppose, for example, that-rivals 
A and B initially supply country X from production facili- 
ties outside X, but that A then produces in X. 
10) B could 
see A's move as posing important risks. For example, pro-. 
duction in X. may expose A to new technologies, giving it 
an advantage over B. With such risks, Knickerbocker 
suggests: 
"prudence argued for the adoption of a risk-minimising 
strategy of industry rivals matching each other's 
moves. To illustrate, if firm B matched, move for 
move, the acts of its rival ...... B's gains, either in terms of earnings or in terms of new capabilities, 
would parallel those of A. And if some of firm A's 
moves turned out to be failures, B's losses would be in 
the range of"those of A. " (p. 24-25). 
The qualification Knickerbocker attaches to this is that 
when collusion is "very strong" firms may divide markets 
among themselves, e. g. A and B agree to be monopolists in X 
and Y respectively. There is then no possibility of match- 
ing. 
Buckley and Casson (1976) criticise Knickerbocker 
(1973) on the fundamental grounds that the objectives of 
firms are never clearly stated. This is correct. It is 
not certain from Knickerbocker (1973) why firms pursue a 
risk-minimising strategy. Moreover, whilst firms will not 
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undertake unnecessary risks, the risk-minimisation hypo- 
thesis goes too far. It implies that if a risk can be 
avoided, it will not be taken, no matter what the potential 
rewards. In reality, even though a firm may be risk 
averse") it seems likely that it will take some risks. 
Nevertheless, the analysis in Knickerbocker (1973) has 
relevance. In a world characterised by the coexistence of 
rivalry and collusion - and accepting Knickerbocker's qua- 
lification regarding the division of markets when collusion 
is very strong --the risks taken by B in not. matching firm; 
A ultimately reduce to one thing, namely: firm Amay be - 
able to drive B out of the market, or-at least force a new 
equilibrium in which B obtains reduced profits. - Even-if B 
does not mind taking risks, i. e. is risk neutral, this. 
threat may induce B to acquire production facilities in X. 
A more specific example may clarify the argument.: 
Assume the initial position, in which both firms supply X 
from elsewhere, leaves-B with profits of 7* from that 
b 
market. Suppose now that firm A acquires production facil- 
ities in country X. B has two choices. It either (i) 
matches A, or (ii) continues to supply X from elsewhere. 
For simplicity, assume that if (i) is chosen, B obtains 
profits of Trb, and if -(ii), it will get zero . profits with 
probability p and irb with probability (1-p), where p--- the 
probability B attaches to being-driven'from market Xif-it 
does not acquire production facilities in X. If (1) is 
chosen, B's profits are nb. If (ii), B's expected profits 
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are (1-p)ib. Then, even if B is a risk neutral profit 
maximiser, it will acquire production facilities in X if 
(1-p)Tfb«b. The higher is p, the more likely is B 'to - 
acquire facilities abroad. If, for example, B is convinced 
that. A will gain no advantage from producing in X, -pýO and 
B is unlikely to follow suit. Similarly, the higher isTr/1b 
the more likely is B to match A's move. 
Thus, firm B may acquire production facilities in 
various countries because of the risk in not matching A- 
in short, because B defends its position. Consider further 
this risk. It refers to any factor influencing A's ability 
to drive B from the market, or to force a new equilibrium 
where B obtains reduced profits. Any determinant of pro- 
duction cost 
12) is therefore vital, because lower costs may 
enable A to undercut rivals. Significant costs are empha- 
sised in the existing literature - albeit not within the 
general framework being presented here. For instance, pro- 
duction in various countries may reduce: raw material costs 
- see, for example, Hilferding (1981), Knickerbocker 
(1973), and Brewer (1980); costs of transporting goods from 
and between factories - see, for example, Hilferding (1981) 
and Vernon (1974); taxes, e. g. import tariffs, investment 
subsidies and profits tax (bearing in mind the possibility 
of avoiding these by transfer pricing) - see, for example, 
Frank (1970), Caves (1971), MacEwan (1972), and Hood and 
Young (1979). It should also be remembered that govern- 
ments determine taxes, and that firms are not passive in 
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their relationships with governments. As Cowling (1982a) 
recognises. 
13) 
"the rate of profits tax can be bid down by threaten- 
ing to export investment, and similarly the rate of 
subsidy for investment can be bid up. Such threats 
will stimulate competitive profits tax cutting and com- 
petitive subsidisation of investment by national 
governments, with each government seeking to maximise 
the rate of investment in its own country" (p. 146- 
147). 
In addition, the determinants of demand are vital. 
Particular emphasis has been given in the literature to 
product differentiation. Where do TNC's fit here? Caves 
(1971) provides an answer, namely: 
14) if firms actually 
produce a good where it is marketed, they are in a better 
position to adapt it to local tastes. Consider the follow- 
ing scenario. Firm A produces good G in country X and 
supplies to countries X and Y. The fact that A is located 
in X suggests it can more readily observe the consumers in 
X, and thus model G accordingly. However, if it observed 
consumers in Y more closely, A might be able to take ac- 
count of their characteristics and modify its product to 
increase profits. 
Similarly to this matching analysis, consider three 
further aspects of defensive action leading to TNC's. The 
first is pursued in particular by Graham (1978). Suppose 
firms A and B produce and sell all of their output in 
country X and, with no other rivals, collude to maximise 
joint profits. However, firm C, producing a similar good 
in country Y, begins to produce and sell in X. Graham 
hypothesises that C's entry 
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"is likely to disrupt established patterns of conduct 
within that market, since the foreign subsidiary 
engages in pricing and product strategies designed to 
capture some of the market share from local firms. " (p. 
88). 
To preempt C becoming too disruptive, A and B could acquire 
production facilities in Y. This would be "a purely reta- 
liatory defensive move" - if A and B can threaten C in Y, C 
may be less disruptive to the equilibrium in X. 
Secondly, firms require entry barriers in their indus- 
tries to prevent new rivals undermining their position - 
existing firms in an industry cannot obtain above normal 
profits if there are potential entrants ready and willing 
l5ý 
to drive profits down. Thus, they will defend their 
market dominance against potential rivals by seeking entry 
barriers. This can explain the existence of TNC's. Two 
possibilities are: 
(i) developing a differentiated product-- e. g. associating 
a brand name with a specific style. As already indi- 
cated, this is facilitated by producing where the good 
is marketed. 
(ii) securing access to raw materials, thereby preventing 
potential rivals from obtaining vital ingredients to 
the production process. 
A third aspect of defensive action concerns Knicker- 
bocker's (1973) view that matching does not explain why a 
firm makes the initial move in producing in various 
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countries; it only explains the activity of firms that 
follow. However, whilst this is correct, Yamin (1980) 
notes that the initial move may be a defence against 
rivals' threatened moves. As such, it is closely related 
to matching behaviour. 
Moreover, and following on from this, Yamin (1980) also 
recognises the crucial point that the initial move may be 
an attack on rivals. 
16) That is, an attempt to obtain 
advantages enabling gain at rivals' expense. The source of 
these advantages is again cost and demand factors. In 
other words, the factors underlying the fears that lead a 
rival to match an initial move also underlie that move; the 
coexistence of rivalry and collusion implies that firms 
defend and attack, that firms look to maintain and improve 
their market dominance. But remember: firms will not 
attack if they believe rivals'. response will leave them 
worse off - they will collude to avoid such outcomes. 
17 
Thus, TNC's may arise because a firm defends itself 
against rivals, fearing the latter will undermine its 
market position, or because it seeks it own cost or demand 
advantages that will undermine rivals' market positions. 
The key to this argument is the coexistence of rivalry and 
collusion. 
The third and-remaining set of explanations for the 
existence of TNC's has the same key. The concept of attack 
- and, indeed, defence - considers firms attempting to gain 
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at their rivals' expense. However, it"could be that a firm 
becomes a TNC because it believes it can increase its 
profits by cost decreases and/or demand changes, but with- 
out affecting its rivals' positions. For example, suppose"" 
firm A initially produces only in country X, and sells in X 
and Y. It then acquires production facilities in Y to 
avoid import tariffs and thus increase its profits. As for 
rivals, A may have decided that it cannot push them from 
the market, or alter their position in the market, and thus 
does not attempt to do so, either before or after it be- 
comes a TNC. The coexistence of rivalry and collusion is 
vital-here because A will not wish rivals to see its pro- 
duction in Y as an attack when it is not an'attack. " Other- 
wise, rivals will retaliate and A will be worse off. " This 
is explored further in Cowling and Sugden (1984), focusing 
on, the possibility of rivals viewing a non-attacking price 
cut as an attack, but presenting a general framework 
applicable to any -form of inter-firm rivalry. The crucial 
point is this: in all of its activities, A's behaviour is 
conditioned by its environment - namely: the coexistence of 
rivalry and collusion. 
This concern with the coexistence of rivalry and col-, 
lusion gives this general theoretical framework its focus 
on the characteristics of" a firm's activities. Thus, 
rather than examining internal coordination of activities` 
versus the alternative, external coordination by market 
forces, "the analysis takes a wider perspective. For 
instance, in discussing Graham's (1978) analysis of defens- 
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ive behaviour, it was supposed that firms A and B initially 
supply country X from production outside X, 'that C then" 
produces inside X, and that A and B therefore must decide 
whether or not to acquire production facilities in Y, where 
C also produces; 'i. e. A and B must decide whether"to pro- 
duce in one or two countries. " These options are both'means 
of internally coordinating activities, simply being a 
choice of where to locate production facilities, given the 
rivalry and collusion environment. Neither contemplates 
the possibility of external coordination by market forces. 
ý, 
Furthermore, this focus on the characteristics of a 
firm's activities has distributional implications, in-` 
direct contrastSto internalisation analysis. Suppose, for 
instance, that firms A, `and B initially` supply country X 
from production in Y, where B employs individual I. When A 
begins production in X, 'B's choice is match or not match. 
If it matches, suppose B reduces its operation in Y and no^ 
longer employs I. The vital point is that I's welfare may 
decline as a result of B's relocation; then, the TNC is not 
an efficient outcome in the sense implied by internali- 
sation analysis. Why? As argued by others, in a world 
characterised by the coexistence of rivalry and collusion, 
there is a tendency towards unemployment - see, for 
example, Kalecki (1939), Baran and Sweezy (1966), and 
Cowling (1982a). Moreover, whilst B's decision may condemn 
I to unemployment, evidence suggests that workers would 
rather be employed than unemployed. Consider, for example, 
Payne's et al (1983) U. K. survey of approximately 400 
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unemployed males, over 90% of whom agreed with"the state- 
ments "having a job is very important to me" and "I hate 
being on the dole". Also suggestive is Field (1979), 
reporting that in 1977,640,000 individuals in the U. K. 
lived in households receiving income below supplementary 
benefit level, despite the household having a wage-from 
full-time work. 
The crucial fact is that a firm matching rivals is- 
concerned with its profits, and not with the possibility 
that its dismissed workers are unemployed. At most, 
workers can attempt to dissuade matching by, for example, 
accepting such low wages - and thereby cutting employers' 
costs - that not matching is found to be the most profit- 
able choice. But it may simply be that no no wage suffi- 
cient to live off is low enough to have an influence. Very 
importantly, it could also be that when negotiating a wage 
to prevent matching, workers do not believe a firm's threat 
to produce elsewhere unless lower wages are accepted. Yet 
if workers are wrong, firms will produce elsewhere. These 
arguments, concerning bargaining, involve issues taken up 
in Section 4. 
There are also other vital distributional implications 
0 resulting from the focus on the characteristics of a firm's 
activities. Consider, for instance, consumers' utility. A 
hornets nest of controversy surrounds, for example, the 
consequences for consumer utility'of product differentia- 
tion. Space contraints alone prevent these issues from 
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being explored here. However, one example illustrates the 
view that TNC's may arise to the detriment of consumer 
utility. Thus, consider the case of a firm acquiring pro- 
duction facilities in various countries to prevent poten- 
tial rivals from entering its industry - e. g. the firm 
secures vital raw material supplies. The entry barriers 
(at least could) 
18) imply a higher product price than would 
otherwise be the case. Assuming their money incomes are. 
unchanged, consumers of the firm's product are therefore 
worse off. In addition, as yet another example of the 
importance of distribution, consider a firm bargaining with 
governments over its tax bill. The critical point about 
bargaining is its distributional consequences. 
Thus, this section presents a general theoretical 
framework providing three sets of reasons for the existence 
of TNC's, namely: defending against rivals; attacking 
rivals; and increasing profits when rivals may see a non- 
attacking move as an attack. The key to this is, the 
coexistence of rivalry and collusion, giving the framework 
its focus on the characteristics of a firm's activities. 
The emphasis is on distributional factors. However, 'it is 
only a general theoretical framework. Within it, specific 
reasons for TNC's arising could be. pursued in more detail. 
Indeed, one such reason is the concern of the following 
section. I ,-_-1. 
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4. LABOUR MARKET DOMINATION 
The purpose here is to pursue the Marglinian framework 
of the previous section in greater depth, and to examine an 
issue that is new vis-a-vis the "why TNC's? " question. The 
section has two parts. The first considers a theoretical 
analysis and the second some empirical evidence. As a 
final introductory comment, note that the aim is to estab- 
lish labour market domination as an at least contributory 
reason for the existence of some TNC's; it is not to 
establish labour market domination as the reason for all 
TNC's. Underlying this is the view that in any one case, 
there is likely to be a number of reasons contributing to a 
firm's decision to become a TNC. 
4.1 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
Consider individual I, a typical worker in country X 
employed by firm A. Define Ui as I's level of utility, 
where: Ui=f (wages). f(. ) is an increasing function of 
wages. As for firm A, assume-it maximises its profits, na, 
where: 
19) 
is=g (wages). Ceteris paribus - bearing in mind 
the discussion of costs in considering rivalry and col- 
lusion in Section 3- the less a worker costs the greater 
are profits, i. e. g(. ) is a decreasing function of wages. 
(Note a vital point: for ease of exposition, f(. ) and g(. ) 
have been simplified by omitting effort - i. e. the inten- 
sity of work. In fact, f(. ) is a decreasing and g(. ) an 
increasing function of effort. Therefore, any reference 
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below to a wage fall is equivalent to a-wage-fall and/or 
effort rise. ) 
A crucial implication of f(. ) and g(. ) is the existence 
of a conflict over wages: a firm will try, to push wages 
down - it looks to dominate its labour market, in the limit 
paying subsistence wages - whereas workers look to increase 
their wages. The outcome of this conflict is determined by 
the bargaining power of workers and employers. Moreover, 
following Burkitt and Bowers (1979), for example, -workers 
have a weaker bargaining position when they do not act20) 
collectively because, for instance: 
(i) the loss of potential utility-to workers from failure 
to settle the conflict is more severe than for 
employers. A-workers sole means of livelihood is the 
sale of his labour, a quick sale generally being 
essential because accumulated savings are small- 
relative to expenditure commitments - see also Preiser 
(1971). In contrast,. employers can often replace. 
specific-workers and/or rearrange the activities of 
remaining workers to offset the loss of profits. 
(ii) there is usually greater competition for. jobs. than for 
workers, and greater competition implies a weaker 
bargaining position. 
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(iii)individual workers are often ignorant of their value 
to particular employers, and less skillful at wage 
negotiation. - 
In contrast, collective worker action - e. g. via trade 
unions - does not suffer these disadvantages to the same 
21 
extent. 
Before continuing with the main analysis,, it should be 
recognised that this entire discussion of bargaining power 
is based upon imperfect labour markets. One important 
aspect of this is that in a perfect labour market, any 
attempt by employers to depress wages and thereby obtain 
above normal profits would be met, by other firms entering 
the market, paying higher wages, and obtaining normal 
profits. In such a case, bargaining power is not a useful 
concept. However, it is reasonable to rule out this 
situation as unrealistic. In practice, industry entry 
barriers limit the set of potential employers, 
22) 
who can 
also be expected to avoid competition for workers that 
pushes wages to the point where only normal profits are 
obtained. That is, employers can be expected to collude 
over wages. 
23) Furthermore, if there is an excess supply 
of workers, collusion is unnecessary; there will be plenty 
of workers for all - and as noted earlier, in a world 
characterised by attempts to dominate product markets, 
which Section 5 suggests is a realistic characterisation, 
there is a tendency towards unemployment. 
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However, returning to the main theme: against this 
background of worker/employer conflict, what is the 
importance of TNC's? Consider the case where firm A can 
choose between two methods of production: it can be a 
national corporation (NC), with production facilities only 
in country X, or a TNC, producing in X and Y. Define: wT= 
the wage paid to I by firm A, if it is a TNC; wN the wage 
paid to I by firm A if it is a NC. Because the choice of 
TNC'versus NC affects the ability of workers to act 
collectively, wT wN. That is, by being a TNC rather than a 
NC, firm A can increase profits by decreasing I's wages, 
24) 
and hence I's utility. 
Thus, Lane (1982a), for example, discusses problems 
faced by British trade unionists in a multi-plant NC, let 
alone a TNC. Whereas workers could theoretically elect 
representatives to plan collective action across plants - 
i. e. they could form "combine committees" - Lane notes 
practical difficulties arising from inter-plant differences 
in union development, and the historical organization of 
unions. 
"From the trade unionist's point of view the multi- 
plant firm raises a host of not readily resolvable 
problems. The wide dispersion of plants over con- 
siderable distances, with location in areas differing 
in their labour movement traditions, means that within 
the divisional structure of any one firm uneven devel- 
opment of trade union practice as between plants is the 
norm. Attempts at forming combine committees always 
fall foul of this problem - and doubly so where combine 
committees organise on an inter-divisional or. inter- 
company basis. If there are difficulties in involving 
activists in such schemes, imagine the problems of 
interesting rank and file. " 
(p. 11). 
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Lane (1982a) continues: 
"These circumstances are compounded by internal union 
organisation. Full time officers in most unions have, 
so to speak, a portfolio of companies within a"given 
geographic area for which they are responsible. It 
follows that the employees of a multi-plant company 
operating in a number of regions must have contact with 
a number of full time officers. Constraints of time, 
resources and variation in outlook as between these 
officers ensures that they neither meet nor exchange 
information on a regular and systematic basis. The 
only point of convergence is through the national 
officer responsible for the company concerned - who 
suffers from precisely the same constraints. "; (p. 11). 
When a number of plants are spread across various 
countries, these difficulties increase considerably. For- 
instance, 25) CIS (1978)-points out with regard to Ford 
workers across Europe: 
"It's difficult enough for Ford workers in one 
country, sharing a common language and separated by 
comparatively small distances, to organise effectively 
against the company on anything more than a local plant 
or shop level. Even here, major problems of communi- 
cation, sectionalism, and cumbersome national union 
machinery arise. On a European scale the problems are 
multiplied many times. Workers in France, Germany, 
Belgium, Spain and the U. K. use six different languages 
plus those of the immigrants. It means much greater 
distances - over a thousand miles from Halewood to 
Valencia, with disproportionately large travel and 
telephone costs as a result. There are that many more 
unions - and another layer, the international union 
organisation, on top. " 
(p. 30). 
Furthermore, this analysis suggests a second, closely 
related explanation for the existence of TNC's. Suppose, 
for instance, firm A decides to erect production facilities 
to manufacture a particular good. Ceteris paribus, it will 
employ those workers accepting the lowest wages. This is 
again determined by bargaining. If all potential workers 
act collectively, employers will simply have to settle for 
the best they can negotiate with, for example, the trade 
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union. However, if workers do not act collectively, 
employers can play off one group against another - bearing 
in mind the factors weakening workers' position when they 
are separated = and therefore secure lower wages. 
26) For 
instance, having asked workers in country X their price, A 
can tell workers in Yýthat if they accept lower wages, they 
get the jobs. When workers in Y concede, firm A can return 
to workers in X and seek still more gains. On some 
occasions, A will be a NC because workers in one country 
always accept the lowest wages. But this will not always 
be so, in which case TNC's arise. 
. 
An appropriate description covering either of these 
bargaining situations is. "separate and dominate"; by 
separating workers into country specific groups, employers 
improve their bargaining position, thereby gaining at the 
expense of workers. 
A possible criticism of this is: "if a worker is better 
off when a firm produces in one country, why does he not 
offer his services more cheaply to the firm if it continues 
to produce solely in one country, and thereby prevent its 
acquiring production facilities elsewhere? "27 This 
criticism can be countered. 
Consider first the case of bargaining when a firm 
erects new production facilities. The argument here 
recognised that a firm may in fact locate in one country, 
depending upon the credibility of threats to locate 
0 
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elsewhere. The crucial requirement is a workforce 
separated into groups that can be played off against each 
other. This involves bluff and counter-bluff, threat and 
counter-threat; perhaps, for example, workers in country X 
simply do not believe that their failure to accept lower 
wages will lead to a firm producing elsewhere. As a 
result, TNC's may arise. The criticism is therefore not 
valid. 
Whereas this aspect of separate and dominate concerns 
bargaining over new investments in, say, period t, the 
first case outlined earlier examines the wage conflict in 
periods t+l, t+2,..., albeit still refering to a decision 
to become a TNC in period t. Compare now two situations. 
In the first, firm A is a NC in country X, and facing 
workers acting collectively. In the second, A is a TNC 
producing in X and Y, and facing workers separated between 
these two countries. Considering again the three 
aforementioned factors illustrating the importance of 
collective action, if A chose the first situation rather 
than the second, it would face a workforce that: 
(i) 'c an inflict greater loss of profits on"the firm if 
the wage conflict is not settled; 
(ii) competes less - indeed, not at all - within itself 
for jobs; 
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(iii) has greater information on the value of particular 
workers to A. 
Will Achoose to be a NC because the workforce will 
restrain itself by not attempting to use factors like (i)- 
(iii)? If yes, workers must assess employers' beliefs 
regarding workers' increased bargaining power in a NC, and 
then convince employers they are not using this greater 
power. However, this is again a game of bluff, etc. Thus, 
TNC's will arise. The criticism is not valid. 
Even more to the point, if yes, workers must restrain 
themselves in period t+l, t+2,... simply because the firm 
could have chosen to produce elsewhere in period t. If 
workers ignore future investments they will make full use' 
of factors like (i)-(iii), simply because what happened in 
the past is in the past. If they do not ignore future 
investments, fear that the firm will subsequently become a 
TNC may temper their behaviour. But as this is again a 
game of"bluff, etc., there will be times when employers 
believe that if they-do not produce in various countries, 
workers may use their full collective strength, at least on 
some occasions. For example, workers may seek as much as 
possible immediately because they are unsure if A will make 
more new investments. Thus, whether or not workers ignore 
future investments, TNC's arise; a firm only secures 
improvements in its bargaining power by being a TNC. 
Again, this criticism°is not valid. This can be simply 
illustrated. Define: , rä =firm A's profits if it produces in 
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countries X and Y; 7r a1 A's profits 
if it produces only in X, 
N2 
and workers use their full collective strength, -7r a_ 
A's 
profits if it produces only in X, and workers do not use 
their full collective strength; p'= the probability 
employers attach to workers using their full collective 
strength when A produces only in X. (If workers ignore 
future investments, p=1; if they may use their full 
collective strength, c p>l. ) Then, if A is a risk neutral 
profit maximiser, 
28) it will become a TNC if: nä > p7r 
ä+ 
(1-p)Trä2 If the only effect on A's costs from becoming a 
T 
TNC is this wage affect, lra -7ra2 > 7rad and pý-Qmeans A 
becomes a TNC. 
29) 
The implication of this theoretical analysis is that, 
similarly to the way Marglin's . (1974) detailed analysis of 
the capitalist/worker relationship led to explanations for 
the rise of the factory, firms' attempts to dominate labour 
markets leads to production in various countries. The 
issue is not internal coordination of activities versus 
external coordination by market forces. Rather, it is a 
comparison of alternative means of internally coordinating 
activities. Moreover, and also in sharp contrast to 
internalisation analysis, distribution and not efficiency 
is a resultant concern; i. e. TNC's may0ý 
3 be formed to 
increase profits at the expense of workers' utility. - this 
31 
is undoubte41y not a more efficient outcome. 
These are important implications. However, and not to 
undermine any of the theoretical analysis developed in this 
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paper, the value of further theoretical discussion is 
limited; no matter how detailed theoretical arguments 
become, without supporting empirical evidence they tend to 
be accepted, at best with scepticism. The concern of the 
remainder of this paper is therefore to examine empirical 
evidence-related to the separate and dominate concept. 
4., 2 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Is there evidence concerning the following separate and 
dominate hypothesis (SDH): an at least contributory reason 
for the existence of some TNC'S is the separation of 
workers into country specific groups enabling a firm to pay 
less wages when it is a TNC rather than a NC? 
It is interesting to examine analyses of wage levels in 
different types of firm. In particular, consider Buckley 
and Enderwick (1983), typical 
32) 
of such studies. 
33) This 
examines, for a sample of Britishmanufacturing plants in 
1980, the average weekly gross pay of selected employee 
groups (namely: semi-skilled manual, skilled manual, and 
clerical workers, and middle management) as estimated by 
senior management. Having identified each plant as U. K. or 
non-U. K. owned, Buckley and Enderwick conclude that the 
data supports the view that, in general, non-U. K. owned 
plants offer comparable or higher wages than their 
indigenous rivals. For the whole sample, median wages are 
higher in non-U. K. plants amongst semi-skilled manual, 
skilled manual, and clerical workers, and virtually 
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identical for middle management. 'Broadly similar results 
are obtained when the sample is broken down by industry, 
although there are exceptions and the authors suggest 
"considerable caution", at least partly due to the small 
sample'in some industries. 
Are these results fatal to SDH? 
34) The answer is no, 
and for several reasons. - 
Accept, for the moment, that comparing average TNC and 
NC wages does test whether or not some firms pay less when 
they are TNC's rather than NC's. That is, accept that, for 
instance, if TNC's tend to pay more than NC's, no firm pays 
less wages when it is a TNC rather than NC. Then, even 
the whole sample result in Buckley and Enderwick (1983) is 
not fatal to SDH; on two counts, it still does not test the 
hypothesis. Firstly, it does not distinguish TNC's and 
NC's. Clearly, a U. K. owned plant could be part of a TNC. 
Then, if a U. K. owned TNC pays sufficiently low wages, 
non-U. K. plants can pay more than U. K. plants whilst TNC's 
pay less than NC's. Secondly, the data ignores effort. 
Yet in the discussion in Section 4.1, it was noted that 
reference to a wage fall is equivalent to a wage fall 
and/or effort rise. In short, even if TNC's pay higher 
wages than NC's, this may be more than offset by greater 
35 
worker effort. Moreover, these two problems aside, and 
moving on to the industry level conclusion, Buckley and 
Enderwick (1983) do not actually contradict SDH. The 
hypothesis merely refers to an at least contributory reason 
- 121 - 
for the existence of some TNC's, whilst their. results 
reveal exceptions to their general finding in some 
industries. 
Furthermore, comparing average TNC and NC wages is not 
a good test of SDH. Again,. there are two points. Firstly, 
a finding that TNC's tend to pay more than NC's does not 
undermine the possibility of some TNC's paying less than 
NC's. As already emphasised, SDH refers to an at least 
contributory reason for the existence of some TNC's. 
Secondly, even if all TNC's pay.. higher wages than all NC's, 
it is, not fatal to SDH. Why? Where a TNC pays higher 
wages than a NC; its existence may nevertheless be 
explained by the separate and dominate concept. 
Suppose firm A is a wage leader in country Y and, that, 
separating workers into country specific groups to thereby 
pay less wages, it acquires production facilities in 
country X. In X, A can be a high payer - for example, 
because it feels this brings forth better workers, or 
because it faces workers well organised within X. Yet it 
can still pay less than if it produced entirely in Y facing 
a workforce acting collectively. For instance, A may use 
its X production to undermine a strike by workers in Y and 
thereby secure lower wages in Y; and/or, in making its 
initial investment in X, A may play off two separated yet 
individually well organised workforces to obtain lower 
wages. In addition, even though A uses its production base 
in X to undermine workers in Y, it can remain a wage leader 
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in Y- for example because it continues to face the best 
organised workers in Y. or because of historical inertia. 
In short, firm A can be a high payer in X and Y, -even 
though separate and dominate is a reason for its producing 
in both countries. Parallel arguments also apply to firm 
B, a firm initially producing solely in country X but now 
producing in X and Y. That is, firm B can be a high payer 
in X and Y, even though separate and dominate is a reason 
for its producing in both countries. 
Thus, observing that a TNC pays more than a NC is 
consistent with SDH. Equally and similarly, 'observing that 
a TNC pays less than a NC is consistent with SDH. The 
critical factor is simply that a firm's wages are less when 
it separates workers across countries than when it produces 
in only one country. Whether the firm is a high payer or 
low payer relative to rivals is not fatal to SDH. 
This discussion leads to an important point, namely: 
studies analysing wage levels in various types of firm have 
not reached the heart of SDH. Moreover, they will not do 
so in the future; this is'ensured by the fact that a TNC 
paying more or less than a NC does not undermine the 
hypothesis. In contrast, the heart of the matter is 
reached when examining the views of participants in the 
firm, and actual cases of firms separating workers into 
country specific groups. 
"' f 
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As regards the former, ILO (1976a) is useful as it 
summarises some trade union views. It notes: 
"union concerns that some multinational enterprises 
are adopting the policy of "dual" sourcing. Under such 
a policy a multinational enterprise would deliberately 
seek to have alternative sources of production for 
given products or components, and thereby reduce the 
impact of a strike in any one country. " (p. 20, 
emphasis added). 
This indicates a belief that firms become TNC's at least 
partly to separate their workers into country specific 
groups enabling them to. pay less wages when they are TNC'S 
rather than NC's. More generally, ILO (1976a) also 
comments : 
"One of the most serious charges which unions make, 
from time to time, vis-a-vis multinational companies is 
that the latter use their internationally-spread 
facilities as a threat to counter union demands and 
power. If the union will not yield, the company can or 
will threaten to transfer its production to another 
country, or the company may utilise already existing 
facilities in another country to penalise the 
"demanding" union, or the company may threaten to 
curtail its future investments in the country in which 
the union is making "unreasonable" (in the company's 
judgement) demands. All of these tactics are subsumed 
by the unions under the general head of threats to 
shift production as part of the labour tactics of 
multinational enterprises. " (p. 19). 
This is supported by "typical" comments from various 
European unions, for example: 
"In many companies the existence of alternative 
sources of supply gives management scope to threaten to 
switch products to other locations. This can be a very 
effectivd6ýargaining counter. " 
(p. 19). 
"the numerous transfers to countries in which wage 
costs are lower weigh heavily on general wage levels 
and undermine the many social benefits which have often 
been acquired afte57xyany years of struggle by the 
workers. " (p. 19). 
"Multinational companies have wide opportunities of 
moving their capital from one country to another. This 
.... makes it more difficult for trade union 
organisations to pursue their demands for higher wages, 
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employment and workers' influence in the firm. " (p. 
19-20). 38) 
Insofar as these views are representative, they imply that 
firms separate workers into country specific groups that 
are played off against each other. They do not say firms 
consequently become TNC's, but they are strongly 
suggestive. That is, it seems especially unlikely that 
firms only ever threaten to invest elsewhere, never 
actually doing so; in practice, it is probable that the 
threats will sometimes be executed. 
These conclusions are supported by Greer and Shearer 
(1981), reporting a survey of U. S. unions, 50 in all, 13 
having experience with non-U. S. owned companies. The 
following table reproduces some results. 
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Table: Number of unions reporting on use of multinational 
bargaining tactics by foreign-owned U. S. firms 
Firms 
Company Tactic frequently Firms seldom Firms 
use tactic use tactic never use 
tactic 
Use of foreign production 
to undercut U. S. union's 
bargaining position 
Threatened use........ 0 1 7 
Actually used......... 0 2 4 
Use of foreign production 
to undercut U. S. union's 
position during a strike 
Threatened use........ 1 1 5 
Actually used......... 1 1 4 
Movement of U. S. production 
facilities abroad or new - 
investments abroad to 
strengthen U. S. bargaining 
position 
Threatened to move, 
invest abroad......... 0 2 6 
Actually moved, 
invested abroad....... 0 2 5 
Source: Greer and Shearer (1981) 
These again raise the dual sourcing issue, and the use 
of threats to shift production elsewhere. Moreover, 
that these are not entirely empty threats is revealed by 
the actual "use of foreign production to undercut U. S. 
union's bargaining position", and "to undercut U. S. 
union's position during a strike"... This still does not 
establish conclusively that a reason. for "foreign 
production" is to undercut U. S. unions, but it does add 
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to the suggestion. Note also the particularly 
interesting claim from 2 unions (out of 7) that firms do 
actually move their U. S. production facilities elsewhere 
or do actually make new investments abroad to'strengthen 
their U. S. bargaining position. These survey results 
are clear evidence in favour of SDH. 
In addition, Greer and Schearer (1981) reports a 
survey of 29 U. S. companies, each non-U. S. owned. 7 out 
of 26 firms agreed they would consider using production 
in various countries to discourage U. S. strikes, whilst 
1 out of 28 agreed they had actually done so. Again, 
whilst this does not say firms become TNC's to improve 
their bargaining power, it is suggestive; if firms 
recognise a means by which they canbenefit from being a 
TNC, this means is likely to be a contributory factor 
explaining their becoming TNC's. These results are also 
supported by ILO's (1976a) reference to the Chrysler 
Corporation Chairman extolling the benefits of dual 
sourcing vis-i-vis bargaining power. Thus, trade 
unionists are apparently not paranoid in their views of 
firms'-activities - at least, not paranoid all of the 
time. 
This is important.. In general, a problem when 
examining any views - firms' or unions' - is the 
interference of political considerations. For example, 
the separation of workers into country specific group's 
to reduce worker bargaining power is not something firms 
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are likely to advertise. 
39) Yet the evidence of the` 
previous paragraph - i. e. evidence based upon firms' own 
views - is, for instance, that at least some firms-do 
separate workers to reduce worker bargaining' power. 
Thus, from both unions and firms - i. e. from both 
parties to the wage conflict - there is evidence 
favouring SDH. Precisely because it comes from both 
parties, despite the political considerations problem, 
the evidence is strong. The fact that ILO (1976a), for 
instance, also refers to firms denying that they 
separate workers does not undermine this conclusion. 
The vital point is: it is not denied by all firms. 
Nevertheless, when examining the views of 
participants in the firm the political consideration 
problem is acute. Always, the issue is: does this 
union/firm really mean what it is saying, or are its 
comments merely political rhetoric? Because of this, 
there are narrow limits to the value of accumulating 
view after view. 
Accordingly, consider now actual-cases of firms 
separating workers. In particular, consider evidence 
from the car industry -a comparatively well documented 
example. This supports the evidence of participants in 
the firm. 
Thus, Steuer and Gennard (1971) report that in 
February 1970, Henry Ford was questioned by Hailwood 
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shop stewards about rumours of new investment going to 
Germany rather than the U. K., it being known that 
Detroit was unhappy with U. K. industrial relations. 
This is taken up by ILO (1976a). Refering, for example, 
to 1971 and the Ford strike in Britain: 
"While this dispute was underway early that year, 
Henry Ford ..... was reported to have declared that 
parts of the Ford Escort and Cortina models .... 
would in the future no longer be made in the United 
Kingdom but would be manufactured in Asia .... 
Mr. Ford came to London shortly thereafter, and in a 
meeting with (then) British Prime Minister Heath, he 
is reported to have let it be known, with regard to 
the company's labour difficulties, that if 
improvements were not forthcoming, the company would 
take its business elsewhere. " (p. 21-22). 
Moreover, the threats are seemingly not empty: 
"In 1973 when-the company decided to locate the 
bulk of its small car engine production in the 
United States (for the Pinto model, sold largely in 
the United States), the Financial Times (22 June) 
reported: "It is no secret that industrial disputes 
in Britain priced the United Kingdom out of the 
market.... " The same paper, added, "There was, of 
course, no guarantee that Britain would ever have 
been selected for such a major development but the 
comments of Henry Ford ... (in) the early part of 
the year made it clear that the United Kingdom had 
dropped out of the running .... " The same report 
added, "the fear of similar labour unrest in Germany 
in the future may have entered into the company 
decision to locate the plant in the United States. " 
(p" 22). 
Nor is Ford the only company concerned: 
"Difficult labour disputes at the Chrysler plants 
in the United Kingdom in 1973, provoked somewhat 
similar overtones or visions of production transfers 
out of the country, or future reductions of company 
investment in the country. " (p. 22). 
Thus: 
"More seriously, the Financial Times also observed 
the labour, disputes at Chrysler were currently 
leading company planners to consider switching 
substantial production to its French (Simca), plants, 
and/or to a partner operation in Japan. " (p. 23). 
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Furthermore, the catalogue of Ford threats against-- 
workers in one country by comparison with workers 
40) 
elsewhere is'again documented in CIS (1978). This 
also reports Ford's decision to deliberately dual source 
Fiesta components to reduce worker bargaining power. 
For instance, engines: 
"in the event of a shutdown of the Dagenham Fiesta 
engine line, the company's aim would be to boost 
output of the Valencia engine line to supply extra 
units to the Dagenham and Saarlouis assembly lines. 
With a higher output of the Valencia engined cars 
from these two plants, stocks of the Dagenham 
engines could'be stretched out to minimise 
interruptions in supply öf any model. Similarly, if 
the Valencia engine plant were shut down .... " (p. 30). 
Finally, and coming more up to date, reports from 
the Financial Times reveal that the threats at Ford 
continue: 
"Mr. Paul Roots, Ford employee relations director, 
told the (U. K. ) unions that the company was 
suffering from high labour costs because of 
overmanning, inefficient working practices and 
failure to achieve production targets. 
'This year, to date, we have achieved only 62 to 64 
per cent of capacity at Halewod and Dagenham against 
100 per cent at Saarlouis in West Germany and 96 per 
cent at'Valencia, Spain', he-said. 
'If we do not get our costs down we cannot compete 
and if we cannot compete we will not s give in 
Britain as a manufacturing company. ýý 
Also, refering to the Vice President for Manufacturing 
at Ford of Europe, Mr. Hayden, during a dispute with 
U. K. workers over investment plans: 
"Although Mr. Hayden denied that Ford was running 
down its British plants, he gave a stiff warning 
that the consequences for future investment would be 
serious if the pigluctivity gap with European plants 
was not closed. " 
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Thus, whereas claims of dual sourcing and threats to 
shift production were examined earlier as evidence 
favouring SDH, the car industry gives actual examples 
regarding both and they are likewise evidence favouring 
SDH. 
43) 
All in all, therefore, there is strong empirical 
-justification for accepting SDH. In short, it is 
reasonable to claim: an at least contributory reason for 
the existence of some TNC's is the separation of workers 
into country specific groups enabling a firm to pay less 
wages when it is a TNC rather than a NC. 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper has analysed various aspects of the "why 
TNC's? " question. Having contrasted Buckley and 
Casson's internalisation approach with Marglin's 
explanation for the factory, it pursues a Marglinian 
analysis. Firstly, a general theoretical framework is 
developed, the coexistence of rivalry and collusion 
giving the framework its focus on the characteristics of 
a firm's activities. Three sets of reasons for the 
existence of TNC's are provided: defending against 
rivals; attacking rivals; and increasing profits when 
rivals may see a non-attacking move as an attack. 
Critically, the emphasis is on distribution, in direct 
contrast to the internalisation analysis. Secondly, 
labour market domination as an explanation for TNC's is 
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pursued in detail. A theoretical analysis is developed 
- maintaining the Marglinian approach: focusing in 
detail on the characteristics of a firm's activities, 
and emphasising the distributional considerations - and 
empirical evidence examined. Thus, labour market 
domination is established as an at least contributory 
reason for the existence of some TNC's. The paper's 
originality is mainly to formulate (at least the start 
of) a Marglinian analysis of "why TNC's? " Within this, 
it places a considerable body*of existing literature in 
a product market domination framework not existing 
elsewhere. 
44) In addition, its concern with labour 
market domination is new as regards the "why TNC's? " 
issue. 
NOTES 
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1) The question is at least important because an 
analysis of the influence of TNC's can be better 
undertaken if it is known why TNC's arise. Moreover, 
as a minimum, the analyses "why TNC's? " and "what 
importance TNC's? " should be consistent. 
2) The paper is not a literature survey, for which see 
Hood and YounT1979), Buckley (1981), or Caves 
(1982). 
3) This work is based on Coase (1937). See also Caves 
(1982). 
4) Dunning (1977,1979,1980,1981) has proposed an 
"eclectic theory" which requires (among other things) 
that internalisation of activities is preferable to 
external coordination, and that a firm has a 
"monopolistic advantage" over rivals. This contrasts 
with the interpretation of the literature in this 
paper: internalisation, on its own, explains the 
existence of firms, including TNC's. Casson (1980) 
supports this view. The monopolistic advantage 
concept comes from the interpretation of Hymer (1960) 
by Kindleberger (1969), discussed in Note 17. 
5) It is unclear if internalisation in Dunning's 
eclectic theory - see Note 4- has efficiency 
implications. If it does not, the point is not 
pursued. 
6) See also Marglin (1982). 
7) See Paper Two for a more detailed discussion of the 
importance of price collusion, and its determinants. 
8) See also Cowling (1982a). 
9) See also Magdoff and Sweezy (1969) and Brewer (1980). 
10)As Vernon (1972) notes, the analysis merely requires 
that firms are rivals, not that they both supply X 
initially. For example, they may both serve Y, and 
A's move into X may cause B to fear that A will 
supply Y more cheaply from X. 
1l)Rugman (1975,1977) suggests firms are actually 
risk-averse profit maximisers, the reason for TNC's 
being that production in various countries reduces 
risk. See also Buckley (1981). Whether or not 
risk-aversion is realistic will not be pursued here. 
Suffice it to note that risk-aversion does not 
undermine the arguments in this paper, and that 
"aversion to risk" immediately prompts the question: 
risk of what? Then, the characteristics of a firm's 
activities discussed in this paper come to the fore. 
12)Adjusting for input quality, of course. 
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13)See also'Gennard (1972) and Fröbel et al (1980). 
14)See also MacEwan (1972). Vernon (1966) makes a 
similar point regarding the introduction of new 
products. 
15)For a general discussion of entry barriers, see for 
instance Encaoua et al (1982). 
16)See also Hymer (1975). 
17)Although Yamin (1980) presents a general framework 
based upon rivalry, collusion is ignored. A further 
fundamental difference from this paper is Yamin's 
acceptance of the view - based upon Kindleberger's 
(1969) interpretation of Hymer (1960) - that a 
"monopolistic advantage" is necessary for a firm to 
become a TNC. This is not required in the general 
framework of Section 3. 
To illustrate the argument, consider firm A, with its 
administrative headquarters and only production 
facilities in the U. K. Suppose A contemplates 
acquiring production facilities in the U. S. A., over 
3,000 miles away. Kindleberger notes: 
"There are costs of operating at a distance, costs 
not only of travel, communication, and time lost in 
communicating information and decisions, but also 
costs of misunderstanding that leads to errors. " (p. 
12) 
These costs would not be faced, for example, by firm 
B, with its administrative headquarters and only 
production facilities in the U. S.. Thus, with 
perfect international markets in technology, factor 
inputs, and products, B would always prevent A from 
acquiring U. S. production facilities. If firm A does 
acquire such facilities, there must be a market 
imperfection; put another way, A must have a 
"monopolistic advantage" over existing or potential 
U. S. firms. 
Assuming firms do face costs of operating at a 
distance, Kindleberger's analysis is correct, by 
definition of perfect markets. However, it is 
undermined by an at least reasonable hypothesis 
contained in Buckley (1981), namely: established 
TNC's have developed techniques to counter distance 
costs, which they do not therefore incur. That is, a 
Hymer/Kindleberger approach cannot explain the 
activity of established TNC's. 
This is not to claim that imperfect markets are 
unimportant. Indeed, the analysis favoured in this 
paper is similar to Kindleberger's (1969): it 
emphasises imperfect markets, and draws upon 
literature in the Kindleberger tradition. However, 
whereas Kindleberger begins with costs of operating 
at a distance and concludes that markets must be 
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imperfect for there to be TNC's, the analysis . 
presented here begins with imperfect markets and 
concludes with implications for "why TNC's? " The 
latter cannot be criticised on the grounds that 
established TNC's do not incur costs of operating at 
a distance, such costs not being a critical issue. 
Although the view contained in Buckley (1981) is at 
least a reasonable hypothesis, it remains true that 
established TNC's operate in a world of imperfect 
markets, and it is this that leads to the acquisition 
of production facilities in various countries. 
18)As a counter-example, it could be that if entry did 
occur, the entrant has an identical cost function to 
existing firms and 'joint profits continue to be 
maximised. But in this case, the implication of the 
firm becoming a TNC is a redistribution of profit; 
i. e. the existing firm does not lose profit to the 
entrant. Again, "this is not an efficient outcome. 
19)There are other arguments of the profits function, 
including effort, and as is clear from Section 3. 
For simplicity alone, they are omitted here. 
20)It is not simply collective bargaining that is in 
issue. For instance, contacts between workers to 
foster information sharing are important. See, for 
example, Enderwick (1983). 
21) For example : 
(i) acting together increases the loss of utility 
to employers from failure to settle the 
conflict. 
(ii) collective action prevents many sellers 
competing amongst themselves. 
(iii) at relatively very little cost to each worker, 
trade unions, for instance, can acquire 
information about a firm's activities, and 
negotiating skill. 
22)See again Note 15. 
23)The existence of localised labour markets is likely 
to be important here insofar as collusion is, ceteris 
paribus, easier the fewer the firms that are 
co Ting. See also the evidence of collusion over 
wages in Forsyth's (1972) survey of Scottish firms. 
24)In his eclectic theory, Dunning (1980) suggests that- 
a TNC's monopolistic advantage may be its ability 
"to reduce the impact of strikes or industrial 
unrest in one country by operating, parallel 
production capacity in another .... "(p. 10). Nevertheless, Dunning's theory is very different from 
the approach in this paper, as earlier footnotes 
indicate. 
25)See also Gennard (1972), Craypo (1975), Ullman 
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(1975), ILO (1976a), Northrup (1978), Kujawa (1979a, 
1979b), and Heifgott (1983). 
26)See also Fröbel et al (1980). 
27)This would not increase the workers' utility, but 
would mean that separate and dominate does not answer 
"why TNC's? " 
28)See again Note 11. 
29)Observe how this analysis of bargaining in periods 
t+l, t+2, ... is closely linked with 
bargaining over 
new investments. That is, when employers bargain' 
with workers over new investment in period t, they 
will bear in mind how those workers have behaved in 
the past. 
30)That is, separate and dominate provides at least 
contributory reasons for the existence of some TNC's; 
it is not the reason for all TNC's. 
31)Cantwell (1984)'criticises the concern with 
distribution in (an earlier version of and therefore) 
this paper, arguing that efficiency is likely to be 
the central issue in a dynamic framework, albeit 
recognising that distribution plays some role. This 
is based on the view that changes in period t, even 
if they involve distributional rather than efficiency 
considerations at t, are likely to inspire more 
efficient outcomes in the longer run - e. g. because 
of the technical innovations that follow. To return 
to Marglin's (1974) analysis, for example: even if 
the factory implied short run distributional rather 
than efficiency changes, in the long run it leads to 
the development of machinery, etc. that implies all 
are better off than in earlier periods. But this 
does not analyse the fact that efficiency versus 
distribution in a dynamic framework requires 
comparison of alternative growth paths - e. g. whilst 
factory production leads to certain machines being 
developed, so too would other forms of production, 
technological innovation being tailored to the 
demands of the innovator. See Cowling (1982a). 
32)That is, typical in the sense of the conclusion drawn 
and of the criticism that can be made of it regarding 
SDH. 
33)'See also Steuer and Gennard (1971), Gennard (1972), 
Dunning (1976), ILO (1976b) - giving a useful general 
survey - and Dunning and Morgan (1980). 
34)In numerous discussions of earlier versions of this 
paper, this point has been raised. 
35) Steuer and Gennard (1971), refering to the U. K., 
note: 
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"the foreign subsidiary, particularly the 
American-owned firm, is alleged to utilise labour 
more effectively, which could be a nice way of 
saying people work harder. " (p. 119). 
36)Comments from a British Trades Union Congress 
Conference Report. 
37)The view of the French CGT. 
38)A statement from a Swedish Metalworkers Union 
Congress. 
39)See ILO (1976a), where this point is recognised. 
40)See again the discussion in Section 4.1, where CIS 
(1978) is quoted. 
41)October 29th, 1983, page 3. 
42)February 23rd, 1984, page 1. 
43)Moreover, the evidence is not confined to the car 
industry. Gennard (1972) notes that Goodyear Tyre 
Company, for example, has used supplies from its 
operations elsewhere to undermine industrial action 
in Britain. Also, Fröbel et al (1980) give an 
illustration of an undisguised threat regarding 
future investment. They discuss the acquisition of 
production facilities in Wexford, Ireland, by Nino 
AG, a West German textile producer. The views of 
Eire's development agency chairman are quoted from 
the economic supplement of the West German newspaper 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: 
"You have heard that this German company wishes to 
extend its operations here in Wexford .... However, the plans for this expansion do not only depend on 
the state of the economy, but also on how much you 
people here in Wexford are willing to cooperate with 
this undertaking ... you should ... bear in mind that we are competing with many other countries in 
the world to obtain new industries, and that there 
are development corporations everywhere. We 
therefore have to convince the investor that he is 
going to find himself in surroundings which will let 
him succeed... " (p. 122). 
44)Throughout, liberal use has been made of footnotes to 
compare the analysis with others. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Existing literature on the separation of ownership 
and control in the theory of the firm is largely confined 
to a static, ahistorical context. 
1 It tends to view modern 
firms as different, both quantitatively and qualitatively, 
from their predecessors. Whereas the latter are seen as 
under the control of their owners, the large corporations 
of today are classified as either owner or manager controlled. 
This classification is based upon an ex post analysis of 
share ownership 
2): if no cohesive group of shareholders - 
i. e. owners - is found to possess more than a fixed per- 
centage of shares, the conclusion is that owners do not 
have control, which is assumed to pass to managers. 
In contrast, the aim of this paper is to present an 
evolutionary approach to the theory of the firm. 
Section 2 explores the theoretical framework, attempting 
to establish an alternative perspective on the control 
problem, and presenting a diagrammatic exposition of the 
argument and some alternatives. Beginning from the position 
where an owner(s) has control and recognizing that control 
is inherently beneficial, it is argued that owners will 
assess the percentage of shares others can obtain before 
control is lost. That is, it is suggested that causality 
in reality runs from control to share distribution. In 
general, the observed distribution of shares will suffice 
to give a subset of owners - "capitalists" - control. 
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The view taken is that this approach is. more plausible 
than alternatives, and as such the burden of empirical 
proof must lie with those favouring these alternatives. 
3) 
Section 3 considers the existing evidence, both direct 
and indirect. The hypothesis, that capitalists control 
firms performs at least as well as the alternatives. 
Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper with a 
brief summary. 
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2. CONTROL OF THE FIRM: * A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 WHAT DOES CONTROL MEAN? 
To avoid semantic misunderstandings, it is initially 
essential to consider the question: what does control 
mean? 
4) 
Throughout the paper, control implies the ability to 
determine broad corporate objectives, despite resistance - 
from others. By broad corporate objectives, we refer to 
decisions taken over strategic issues, such as "the rules 
of the game" (i. e. a firm's relationship with rivals), the 
national or international orientation of the firm, and its 
relationship with the state, foreign governments, workers 
(and other non-controlling groups in the firm), sources 
of raw materials, and markets. See Zeitlin (1974). Control 
does not imply the making of day-to-day decisions over 
tactical issues, such as promotional activities, the choice 
of particular projects from a set of alternatives, etc.. 
Whereas these issues are significant for the short run 
smooth functioning of the firm, it is our assumption that, 
subject to rare exceptions 
5), it is the long run strategic 
decisions which determine the success or failure of the firm. 
Although the remainder of the paper simply refers 
to control, it should be noted that such control can in 
fact be "actual" or "potential". 
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Thus, from the time a strategic decision is taken, 
the problem of the best way of implementing it arises. 
This is not necessarily the concern of those taking the 
decision; it may be left to others specifically employed 
and/or trained for such a purpose. These individuals may 
be left with discretion as to the exact means of implementa- 
tion, but this only implies control if two conditions are 
met: 
(i) The exercise of discretion replaces the 
strategic decision with another, and 
(ii) it succeeds in implementing this decision 
despite resistance from the original 
decision takers. 
This would essentially be a transfer of control, a 
possibility analysed later in the paper. 
If neither (i) nor (ii) is satisfied, control is 
with the original decision takers. However, if condition 
(i) is satisfied but (ii) is not, the situation is one 
of actual control; i. e. a strategic decision is altered 
but resistance from the original decision takers results 
in the original decision being implemented. Moreover, it 
is also possible that these day-to-day decision takers 
challenging the strategic decision will be punished, for 
example sacked, or not promoted. 
- 142 - 
However, in practice prospective challengers'to a 
strategic decision can often be expected to realise the 
futility of a challenge, or to appreciate that a challenge 
would merely lead to their punishment. Therefore, they 
will not attempt to change a strategic decision. That is, 
control is more likely to be potential rather than actual, 
albeit this is equally as real. See also Zeitlin (1974), 
Scott and Hughes (1976), and Nyman and Silberston (1978). 
Finally as regards definitions, note that throughout 
the paper, control exercised via a holding of shares is 
defined as owner control, whether or not those owners 
also play a role in the day-to-day decision making of a 
firm. In particular, the paper makes no attempt to analyse 
the consequences of control exercised by those who also 
make day-to-day decisions as against control exercised 
by those who do not make such decisions. 
6) 
2.2 AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Consider now the following situation. Firm F-a 
typical firm in nineteenth century capitalism - is a small 
enterprise owned entirely by individual(s) C- where C 
represents "capitalist(s)". Workers are employed to 
perform certain tasks, but C is in total control of the 
firm. Thus, firm F is indisputably an owner controlled 
firm. 
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Suppose now that the firm expands. Will control be 
lost by C? If so, to whom? The answer to these questions 
can be sought in an exploration of the two critical needs 
of an expansion, namely: 
(i) finance - e. g. a new factory must be paid for - and 
(ii) managers - to administrate the now more complex 
and bulky firm organisation. 
The prevailing view amongst economists appears to be 
that C does lose control, and to management. See, for 
example, Marris and Mueller (1980). This is based upon the 
observation that finance is obtained by the issue of shares 
in the firm to (often) numerous shareholders. The latter own 
the firm, possessing the right to hire and fire management, 
and receiving a dividend on each share. However, because 
there are (often) so many shareholders, it is argued that, 
save in exceptional circumstances, the power to hire and 
fire is to all intents and purposes non-existent. Managers 
therefore have discretion in following their own. objectives. 
See also Scott (1979). 
This managerial approach is deficient on at least 
three closely related counts: 
(i) It is unclear where the notion that exceptional 
circumstances results in owners' intervention 
fits within the overall concept of control. 
Exactly what does this power of intervention 
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" entail? This deficiency of managerialism arises 
from a failure to explore the meaning of control. - 
(ii) Even if it is accepted that owners lose control, 
managerialists only assume that managers have 
control. See Zeitlin (1974). But why not workers, 
for example? 
(iii) In their largely static, ahistorical analysis, 
managerialists have never. adequately explained 
why the original owner(s) should be expected to 
lose control to managers. Put another way, the 
critical issue is: given that C initially controls 
the firm, why should C, in choosing that the firm 
expands, choose to give away control? 
(iii) is the fundamental issue that will now be addressed. 
The first point to note follows from the definition 
of control. The ability to determine broad corporate 
objectives despite resistance from others implies something 
inherently beneficial in possessing control. That is, who- 
ever possesses control can make the firm follow a strategy 
that best suits his (or their) interests, rather than one 
prefered by others. The essence of the issue is consequently 
distributional) , namely: who is to benefit and who lose 
as a consequence of the alternative strategies for deploying 
the often vast resources available to a firm? Moreover, it 
should also be recognised that control may be desired in 
its own right, not simply because it enables its possessor 
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to pursue other ends desirable per se, but because the 
power to make decisions confers utility; see, for example, 
Rothschild (1971). 
Thus, there is an a priori 
not be willing to give away his 
be surprising, assuming C has ai 
chose expansion and as a result 
losing the benefits it, confers. 
prospect that expansion and the 
are chosen. 
expectation that C will 
(their) control. It would 
ay option, if he (they) 
lost control, thereby 
More likely is the 
maintenance of control 
Such an outcome merely requires a weak non-satiation 
assumption: assuming the consumer - in this instance C- 
is not satiated in either of two non mutually exclusive 
goods - in this instance, expansion and control - then 
both goods will be consumed. 
For obvious reasons, direct evidence on this issue 
is difficult to acquire; owners will be reluctant to 
voice their intention not to give away control. However, 
asa rare instance of this happening, Marglin (1974) 
reports the case of a nineteenth century owner who did 
not allow his manager to obtain perfect knowledge of the 
work process, as a means of preventing the manager from 
taking his business. This example indicates the will on 
the part of owners to retain control rather than giving 
it to managers, the implication being that owners will 
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attempt to invent appropriate means by which their desire 
is1 realised. Unless their failure and/or unwillingness is 
proved beyond doubt, the expectation should be that C 
will retain control. 
Nevertheless, it must be asked whether or not this 
a priori expectation can withstand closer scrutiny. The 
possibilities can be explored by considering an expanding 
firm's need for finance and managers. 
2.3 AN EXPANDING FIRM'S NEED FOR FINANCE AND MANAGERS 
First of all, consider the issue of shares. 
8) Broad 
corporate objectives can be voted upon and therefore 
determined at shareholders' meetings. The ability to win 
such votes can thereby determine who controls a firm. Thus, 
possession of sufficient votes can imply control. 
Moreover, it is generally accepted that it is not 
necessary to have 51% of the shares to win a vote. For 
example, using a probability model Cubbin and Leech (1983) 
suggest that well under 10% may be more than sufficient, 
2% or even 1% being enough in some cases. 
9) In practice, 
therefore, it could well be that in obtaining finance for 
the expansion of firm F, C retains a sufficient share- 
holding to maintain control. This is crucial. 
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Consider again the managerialist approach. This 
examines the'ex post distribution of shareholdings, 
arguing: if C has less than a fixed percentage of 
shares - the percentage being assumed, e. g. in Berle and 
Means (1967), or evaluated, e. g. in Cubbin and Leech (1983) - 
the conclusion is that C has lost control, which, in the 
absence of other significant shareholdings, is assumed 
to pass to managers. 
Such reasoning is not plausible. Causality in the 
managerialist argument runs from share distribution to 
control; failure to own a specified percentage implies 
loss of control. Yet it is surely more plausible to begin 
from the position where owner(s) C has control, recognize 
that control is inherently beneficial, and assume that 
C will at most obtain finance from others just to the 
point prior to the loss of control. 
10) 
In reality, however, C may not have access to the 
financial reserves that allow the purchase of a controlling 
interest. One of two outcomes can be expected in this 
situation. 
Given the benefits of control, C's first reaction 
will be to attempt to collude with another shareholder 
to form a controlling interest. It seems reasonable to 
assume that the costs of such collusion will, at least 
amongst a few shareholders, be very small compared to 
the benefits; a few well-timed business lunches for example, 
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may suffice. Following, for instance, Cubbin and Leech 
(1983), the exact number of shareholders needed in the 
controlling group depends upon the share distribution 
and the voting behavior of shareholders. However, the 
only case where collusion amongst more than a few share- 
holders will be necessary is where there is another group 
of shareholders competing for control. There would then 
be a struggle between these groups, one of which would 
emerge as in control - or, indeed, the groups may join 
forces. In any event, a group of shareholders - capitalists - 
will control the firm. 
Neither of these expected outcomes will be realized 
if owners misjudge the critical percentage of shares 
necessary for control. This is a feasible possibility in 
exceptional cases but, if managerialism is to be accepted 
as realistic, it implies acceptance not only of the 
assumption that, in default of owners control, managers 
control, but also of the view that all owners in all firms 
misjudge the critical percentage. Can it really be believed 
that all owners are incompetent? Surely not. Moreover, 
even where an exceptional mistake is made, recognising 
this owners can be expected to form a new cohesive group 
and regain control. 
11) 
, 
The conclusion to be reached thus far is therefore 
that it is reasonable to hypothesise that a subset of owners 
- i. e. capitalists - control firms. 
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A further argument advanced by managerialists focuses 
upon information, namely: the many small shareholders in 
a firm do not have the information to monitor managers - 
i. e. they do not have the information to determine whether 
or not their interests are being served - and therefore 
do not control the firm. This directly contrasts with the 
neoclassical approach, in which all shareholders are taken 
to have, and to act upon, this information. See, for 
example, the exposition in Lambrinides (1973). What can be 
said of these two views? 
Firstly, they reveal. that our hypothesis of capitalist 
control implies that capitalists: 
(i) can win a vote amongst shareholders, and 
(ii) have the information upon which to vote. 
That is, (i) and (ii) are both implicit in the statement 
that, for instance, 1% of shares suffices to control a firm. 
This is a plausible hypothesis. It seems reasonable to 
suggest that capitalists will assess and obtain the informa- 
tion they need for control. Why? Although obtaining informa- 
tion is not costless, the reward is the power to determine 
a firm's strategy. The benefits of the latter can be 
expected to warrant the acquisition of information. 
This is not to say that managers have no discretion 
in their behaviour. In a world of uncertainty, there will. 
always be discretion. But the crucial factor to realise is 
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that this discretion is analytically parallel to that of 
workers. Similarly to the way in which the controller of 
a firm may be unsure what the worker can do, * there may be 
uncertainty surrounding managers. 
12) Capitalists will not 
base their strategic decisions on perfect information, 
either as regards workers or managers. Nevertheless, 
imperfect information does not constitute failure to make 
the decisions. 
The reason that less than 51% of'shares is needed to 
control a firm - and thus a reason that the neoclassical 
approach is incorrect - is that many, indeed the vast 
majority of shareholders obtain their shares to receive 
dividends or capital gains, content in the knowledge that 
other shareholders are concerned with these issues. One 
possibility is that this vast majority is not interested 
in monitoring a firm's activities - perhaps, for example, 
they have complete trust in the minority controlling share- 
holders. Or it could be that each small shareholder 
considers futile an attempt to win a vote against a large 
shareholder. Then again, perhaps the vast majority cannot 
acquire information about the firm - for instance, they 
may have no "contacts" in the firm or industry. 
But are we to believe this of C? More generally, are 
we to believe that larger shareholders will simply ignore 
corporate strategy and give managers, for example, a free 
hand? Surely not. Whilst their information may not be 
- 151 - 
perfect, it is most unlikely that they get themselves into 
a position where it is non-existent, given the benefits 
of control. This view is supported by the fact that high 
level managers are normally recruited from the ranks of 
owners, or at least their close environment. That is, they 
are owners themselves, and/or owners functionaries. See, 
for example, Nichols (1969), Nyman and Silberston (1978), 
and Francis (1980). From this, it should be expected that 
high level managers have interests closely connected with 
owners rather than low. level managers, and therefore will 
assist capitalists in their control of the firm. However, 
it should not be expected that capitalists only acquire 
their information from high level managers; rather, they 
will use outside sources, and, indeed, their own wits in 
reaching their decisions. 
Consider now another possible argument for manager 
control, albeit one apparently absent in the existing 
literature. This is the view that managers are in such 
short supply that they can demand control of the firm 
as the price of their services. C would pay this price if 
he (they) believed he would be better off as a share- 
holder in a manager controlled larger firm rather than 
himself controlling a smaller enterprise. 
Note firstly that this is a bargaining problem again 
analytically parallel to the owner/worker relationship. 
For example, when a skilled crafstman is employed by a 
firm, a price is negotiated. It is theoretically possible 
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that skilled craftsmen can demand control of the firm as 
the price of their services. Similarly, owners negotiate 
with managers. 
Moreover, in reality this theoretical possibility of 
manager control is at most likely to be no more than a 
passing phenomenon. In the first place, the supply of 
managers is endogenous to the system, and at least partly 
determined by a firm's controllers. Managers are needed 
to administrate the firm. As with all "talents", the 
ability to administrate varies, across the population, 
but at least to a large extent it is something that can 
be learnt. It is no coincidence that numerous schools of 
management have emerged simultaneously with expanding 
13) firms. It is clearly in the interests of capitalists 
to encourage such schools. Moreover, firms can introduce 
internal training schemes, thereby producing their own 
administrators. Secondly, if the price of managers is 
control, it is by no means clear it will be"paid; after 
all, the consequence of transfering control is the inability 
of capitalists to. protect their interests, a heavy price 
indeed. 
There is also a. third, more important comment to be 
made. Suppose managers could demand control. Would they 
leave it at this? By. definition of their position, share- 
holders could, if the supply of managers subsequently 
increased, sack their existing management and reclaim 
control. That is, owner control is at least only dormant. 
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If managers have control, it is because it is allowed by 
owners. Thus, if managers have such a strong bargaining 
position, they should be expected to require shares as 
part of their payment. By becoming owners, they safeguard 
their control. But this is then owner control of the firm, 
not manager control. 
14) 
The notion that owner control is at least only dormant 
is important. It was seen earlier when it was argued that 
owners could regroup to regain control if they misjudged 
their position. A crucial conceptual difference between 
owners and managers is that owners can choose whether or 
not they determine a firm's strategy. In this sense, 
managers always take'a back seat. 
15) 
Thus, the conclusion to be reached from the analysis 
in this and the previous Subsections is that it is reasonable 
to hypothesise that a subset of owners - capitalists - 
control firms. An aspect of the analysis deserving 
particular emphasis is the inversion of causality as 
compared to managerialism. Rather than examining ex post 
what percentage of shares capitalists need for control - 
as managerialists have done - it is better, bearing in 
mind the benefits of control, to examine what percentage 
a subset of owners will allow others to obtain before 
control is lost. The share distribution observed in 
reality will then be one which suffices to give control 
to a subset of owners. 
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Such an approach accomodates two related ideas: 
(i) the concept of fixed shareholding percentages 
as used by managerialists is artificial, and 
(ii) the percentage of shares required for control 
may vary across firms - in one, for example, 
it may be 1%, in another 5% . The outcome 
depends upon the distribution of ownership, 
and groupings amongst shareholders. 
The approach to control we are suggesting is similar 
to managerialism insofar as both assert something about 
reality without giving proof. However, the approaches 
contrast in their starting points; managerialism does not 
have a dynamic, historical perspective. It is this difference 
in perspective that makes managerialism less appealing than 
our approach. 
A further criterion for choice between the approaches 
is the empirical evidence that can be marshalled - either 
direct evidence, or indirect evidence that examines implica- 
tions of the approaches. This is the concern of the next 
Section. 
First of all, however, it is useful to depict some 
of the arguments made above by a series of diagrams. 
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2.4 A DIAGRAMMATIC. EXPOSITION 
Figures 1-4 show various analyses16) of the control 
issue. In each, boxes are used to represent individuals or 
groups of individuals - "classes" - participating in a 
firm. As will become clear, the box at the top of each 
diagram - the box to which all others are linked - 
represents the controlling class. Thus, Figure 1 represents 
the starting point of Section 2.2 . Firm F, typical of 
nineteenth century capitalism, is owned and controlled by 
a capitalist, C. The firm employs workers, W. Box C 
represents capitalists, box W workers, and box C is 
drawn above box W to show that, of the two classes, 
capitalists are in control. 
Moving to the twentieth century, there has been an 
expansion of firms and a consequent controversy-surrounding 
their control. Figure 2 depicts our suggested outcome. The 
need for finance implies that ownership is divided amongst 
shareholders. However, either the original controlling 
individual(s) can be expected to retain control, or control 
will pass to another subset of shareholders, which may or 
may not include the original controllers. In either case, 
the controlling owners can still be refered to as capitalists. 
Thus, in Figure 2, C and W again denote capitalists and 
workers respectively. S denotes the non-controlling share- 
holders, and M managers. 
17) 
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FIGURE 1: CONTROL IN A TYPICAL NINETEENTH CENTURY FIRM 
FIGURE 2: CONTROL IN A TYPICAL FIRM TODAY 
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Figures 3 and 4 show the neoclassical and managerial 
approaches respectively. In the former, all shareholders 
have control - there is no dominant capitalist subset. Thus, 
in Figure 3 S' represents all shareholders. This is a 
special case of Figure 2, where C controls S. Again M and 
W depict managers and workers. Figure 4 shows the managerial 
approach. Not only is C absent, but also managers, M, 
control all owners, S', and workers, W. The reversal of 
the-roles of S' and M in Figures 3 and 4 is due mainly to 
information differences. 
Whereas Figures 1-4 depict various approaches in a 
consistent and therefore comparable framework, Figure 5 
represents only the approach to the control of the firm 
advanced in this paper. In brief, beginning with firm F, 
owned and controlled entirely by individual(s) C, expansion 
implies a need for finance and management. The former 
results in the issue of shares. The original and/or new 
owners assess the percentage of shares required for control. 
If their assessment is correct, shareholders are divided 
into capitalists and others, capitalists having control. 
If it is wrong, control passes to non-shareholders, but 
there will be a reassessment of the critical percentage 
needed for control. As regards managers, if they are in 
short supply they may become owners and thus controllers. 
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FIGURE 3: CONTROL IN A TYPICAL FIRM TODAY - 
THE NEOCLASSICAL APPROACH 
FIGURE 4: CONTROL IN A TYPICAL FIRM TODAY - 
THE MANAGERIAL APPROACH 
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3. CONTROL OF THE FIRM: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
3.1' DIRECT EVIDENCE 
A crucial, original aspect of the argument in Section 2 
is the inversion of the causality used by managerialists. 
Thus, any empirical "evidence" that merely considers an 
'ad hoc critical percentage of share ownership to determine 
control type is not really evidence at all. For example, 
18) 
when Berle and Means (1967) note that in 44% of the 200 
largest US corporations no cohesive group of shareholders 
owns at least 20% of shares, this reveals nothing. In fact, 
the suggestion in Section 2 is that whatever share di$tribu- 
tion is observed, this will be that which ensures control 
for a subset of owners, save if an exceptional mistake 
has been made and not rectified. That is, virtually all 
firms are expected to be owner controlled. Thus, as regards 
direct empirical examination of the issue, the implication 
is that as analysis becomes more detailed, so more firms 
will become classified as owner controlled. For example, 
the 44% of firms Berle and Means (1967) classify as having 
no cohesive group of shareholders with at least 20% of 
shares should, on closer examination, be revealed as 
actually owner controlled. 
However, it is not entirely clear what a more detailed 
study entails. For instance, Scott and Hughes (1976) show 
that a more careful examination of shareholder groups 
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reveals that the proportion of firms satisfying the 
managerialists' criteria for owner control is higher than 
might otherwise be expected. 
19) 
Analysing 220 Scottish 
registered firms with stock exchange quotations, they 
initially conclude that in 77% of cases an individual, 
institution, or cohesive group owns at least 5% of shares, 
and therefore classify these as owner controlled firms. 
Moreover, recognising that, they too may actually be owner 
controlled, some of the residual 23% were examined in 
more detail. Sure enough, owner control was found to be 
more widespread than initially concluded. For example, 
the Scottish and Continental Investment Trust was included 
in the 23%, but closer study revealed that nearly 20% of 
its shares were held by various members of the Murray 
Johnstone group of investment trusts. 
But what does such a result show? whereas it may help 
to pursuade some who believe the managerialists' criteria 
is useful that in fact owners control firms, if it is 
accepted that the criteria is inappropriate, such studies 
do not in fact take the analysis much further. 
What is needed is a departure from shareholder 
distribution analysis. It is necessary to examine the 
policies actually pursued by companies and assess whether 
or not these appear to be determined by owners or managers. 
This is clearly a very complex, time consuming task, but 
it has been attempted by Francis (1980a). 
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Francis argues that, within a firm, the Chairman of 
the Board plays a vital role. This is apparently a clear 
result of the Oxford Growth of Firms Project (upon which 
the analysis is based): 
"From observation, from interviewing and from 
administering a questionnaire in the companies in our 
study it was clear that the Chairman of the company 
was in a very dominant position. The role was viewed, 
both by the incumbent and by senior managers, as the 
peak of the firm's organizational hierarchy and not 
merely a primus'inter'pares at Board meetings. His. 
influence in decision making was acknowledged by all 
to be powerful. " (p. 12) 
Thus, Francis concludes that a detailed examination of 
who the chairman is - for example, an owner? - or how he 
'came to be appointed - e. g. by owners? - will reveal the 
centre of control. 
Time constraints restricted his study to a mere 17 
firms. Nevertheless, the result is very illuminating: (at 
least) 15 of the firms were classified as owner controlled, 
and (at most) only 2 as controlled by their own professional 
management. These 17 firms were randomly drawn from a 
sample of 227 of the "top 250" UK companies in the 
"Times 1000" (1975-1976). Of these 227, in 110 - i. e. 48% - 
at least 5% of shares were owned by an individual, 
institution, or cohesive group. Admittedly 17 is a very 
small sample, but the proportion of owner controlled 
firms in the more detailed study was classified as 88%! 
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Such results are consistent with the analysis of 
Section 2. However, it should be remembered that the latter 
suggests the two management controlled firms found by 
Francis are either exceptional cases or, in a still more 
detailed examination, would be revealed as owner controlled. 
Unfortunately, such evidence is not easily acquired. 
Although Francis' approach is very useful in highlighting 
the inadequacy of the fixed percentages type of criteria, 
and indicating that a more elaborate analysis is. far from 
supporting the managerial approach, it is not conclusive. 
Other direct evidence consistent with the analysis 
of Section 2 is reported cases of owners in fact replacing 
managers. For instance, Nyman and Silberston (1978) discuss 
the cases of a group of, dissatisfied owners bringing about 
the replacement of senior managers in two UK companies, 
Vickers and Debenhams. However, such evidence is also 
consistent with managerialism, given the latter's acceptance 
that owners can hire and fire managers in exceptional 
circumstances - see again the discussion in Section 2.2 
Nevertheless, a way in which the approaches can be 
distinguished is by considering their differing implica- 
tions. Such indirect evidence is the concern of the 
following Subsection. 
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3.2 INDIRECT EVIDENCE 
One indirect means of acquiring support for our 
approach is to observe changes in the organisational form 
of firms. As already emphasised, the idea that owners 
control does not deny the possibility of managers having 
discretion in the day-to-day decisions of a firm. Although 
such discretion does not constitute control, it-does imply 
the possibility of managers attempting to change a 
strategic decision - see again Section 2.1. However, the 
original controllers can be expected to resist such a 
change, if it is attempted, and indeed to preempt the 
possibility of an attempt. Within this framework, the 
relatively recent phenomenon of the transition of most 
firms in the UK and Europe from a so-called U-form 
organisation to an M-form organisation can be explained. 
The U-form organisation is characterised by a board 
of directors and various divisions each responsible for 
a specific function - such as production, marketing, etc. - 
throughout the firm. Williamson (1970) has suggested that, 
as a U-form firm expands, there is a tendency for decisions 
over broad corporate objectives and the day-to-day opera- 
tions of the firm to become entangled. In contrast, an 
M-form organisation is characterised by a board of 
directors responsible solely for determining strategic 
decisions, and a series of operating divisions - each 
responsible for its own production, marketing, etc. - 
making day-to-day decisions. Thus, the transition from 
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U-form to M-form can be explained in terms of control. In 
the M-form firm, broad corporate objectives are determined 
by the board, which is only concerned with such issues. 
This allows the controlling group to focus upon the 
relevant control issues more easily than in the U-form 
organisation. 
Moreover, there is evidence supporting this view that 
organisational form is an issue of control. For example, 
Steer and Cable (1978) have concluded from a study of 
83 UK companies over the period 1967-71 that a firm's 
profitability is affected by whether it has a U-form or 
M-form organisation. This suggests that organisational 
form does affect a firm's strategic decisions. 
These results20) fit neatly into our theoretical 
framework; the transition to M-form can be seen as a 
response by capitalists to an attempt by managers to 
seize control, or as a means of preempting an attempt. 
21) 
However, the same cannot be said for the managerial 
approach. The only way managerialism could offer a sound 
explanation for this transition to M-form and its resulting 
constraint of low level managers to nothing but day-to-day 
decisions would be by arguing that a conflict arose over 
control between low level managers and high level managers 
(i. e. those having contact with the board). But this would 
merely undermine the very foundations of managerialism. 
Evidence referred to in the previous Section on the class 
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origin of high level managers and their connections/ 
relationships with owners takes on great importance. If, 
as posited, high level managers are owners themselves, 
or owners functionaries, the observed conflict would in 
fact be one of owners versus managers, not an endo- 
managerial conflict. 
Consider finally an implication which distinguishes 
our approach from neoclassicism; that is, from the view 
that 'all owners have control. Fortunately, empirical 
evidence on this issue is easier to acquire, at least as 
regards one of the important implications of the two 
hypotheses, namely: the consumption-savings decision of 
households. 
In its general form, the private (i. e. personal plus 
corporate) savings function can be written: 
Sprv =s (Ytrs , Sc , zt) 
10 
where, in period t: Strv private saving, Ytrs = personal 
disposable income, St corporate retentions, and zt =a 
vector of "other" explanatory variables. 
At least in the "Life-Cycle" form exposited by Ando 
and Modigliani (1963), the neoclassical hypothesis of 
consumption-savings behaviour by households implies that 
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the estimated coefficients of the Ytrs and St variables 
should be the same. This is discussed more fully by 
Pitelis (1982), (1983). The outcome basically results 
from the idea that control in particular firms is of no 
consequence to the observed aggregate saving in an economy 
since shareholders can always switch from one corporation 
to another if they realize others control the corporations 
they own. Such behaviour would constrain potential 
controllers - for example, a"subset of owners or managers - 
from diverging away from owners decisions. Thus, effective 
control is always with all shareholders, implying that 
aggregate savings propensities via both personal disposable 
income and their income in the form of corporate retentions 
will be the same. In short, there is perfect substitutability 
between personal and corporate savings. 
In contrast, if a subset of households control firms, 
and hence determine the level of corporate retentions, the 
implication is that the estimated coefficient on St is 
significantly higher than that on Ytrs . There are various 
possible explanations for this. For example, for a 
controlling subset of owners - i. e. capitalists - observed 
corporate retentions will simply reflect their earlier 
decision not to consume or save as personal savings a 
part of their income. Since an ex ante preference for 
lower retentions is simply reflected in a lower ex oast 
retentions ratio 
22), 
no substitutability should be 
expected between observed corporate retentions and 
personal savings. As regards non-controlling groups, if 
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personal savings are too low to allow any substitutability 
with corporate retentions - as evidence suggests - then 
a similar "add-on" phenomenon will be observed - i. e. a 
rise in retentions will not be accompanied by a fall in 
personal saving. 
The existing empirical evidence conclusively rejects 
the neoclassical argument. It suggests the propensity to 
save out of St is significantly higher than the propensity 
to save out of Ytrs . See, for example, Pitelis (1983) for 
evidence and a survey. 
" Although this does not discriminate our approach from 
managerialism, which, for example, Marris (1964) shows to 
result in similar implications, it at least offers some 
conclusive evidence against the neoclassical argument as 
developed in the Life-Cycle hypothesis. 
Thus, the conclusion to be reached from this 
examination of existing empirical evidence, both direct 
and indirect, is that our hypothesis performs at least 
as well as the alternatives. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
By following an evolutionary approach to the theory 
of the firm, it has been argued that a subset of owners - 
capitalists - can plausibly be expected to control firms. 
Particularly important is the inversion of causality that 
leads to this result: rather than examining ex post the 
percentage of shares needed for control, it is better, 
bearing in mind the benefits of control, to examine the 
percentage capitalists will allow others to obtain before 
control is lost., 
Moreover, although the plausibility of this capitalist 
control hypothesis implies that the. burden of proof lies 
with those favouring its alternatives, the hypothesis 
performs at least as well as alternative approaches when 
confronted with existing empirical evidence, direct and 
indirect. 
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NOTES 11 
1) There are some notable exceptions, such as Francis 
(1980a), and Nyman and Silberston (1978). 
2) See Scott (1979) for a survey. 
3) See also Fitch (1972). 
4) Such a discussion is noticeably absent in other 
work by economists. 
5) That is, a totally incapable management. 
6) See the discussion in Cubbin and Leech (1983) of 
internal versus external control. 
7) See the discussion of firms' organisational form - 
an issue taken up in Section 3- in Cowling (1982a). 
8) It is also possible that the need for finance is met 
by borrowing from banks and other financial institutions. 
This is not an issue that will be explored in this 
paper, where the concern is with owner versus manager 
control. However, note that the original controllers 
will not be indifferent regarding the two ways of 
obtaining capital. In particular, capital possessed 
by financial institutions is normally more concentrated 
than that possessed by the vast majority of households. 
See Zeitlin (1974) for evidence. Such concentration 
facilitates the possibility of financial institutions 
asking a higher price for capital. They could, for 
example, require that a certain strategy be followed, 
i. e. they could demand control as the price of their 
funds. In this instance, whilst control is not retained 
by owners, it does not pass to managers. Such possibilities 
raise interesting issues that could be pursued further. 
9) The value of empirical studies based upon share distribu- 
tions will be discussed in Section 4. 
10) A similar argument is made in Francis (1980a), but its 
implications (i. e. the reverse causality argument) are 
not explored. 
11) Albeit the new controlling group need not include the 
original controllers. 
12) A consequence of this is that capitalists will pursuade 
and cajole workers and managers into adopting their 
objectives. 
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13)- What is more, the cost of this to firms has been 
minimal because such schools are often state financed. 
14) See also Cubbin and Leech (1983). 
15) Similarly to managers and workers, financial institu- 
tions may bargain for control as the price of their 
funds. See note 8. 
16) Other theoretical frameworks could also be depicted 
by such diagrams - e. g. the "Marxist managerialist" 
approach of Baran and Sweezy (1966). 
17) Note that the diagrams are not designed to depict 
the entire hierarchical organisation of firms. They 
merely show which class has control. Thus, for 
instance, it is not being suggested that managers do 
not have some measure of power over workers by virtue 
of their making tactical decisions. 
18) See also Cubbin and Leech (1983) for a non-exhaustive 
but useful summary. 
19) See also Zeitlin (1974), Nyman and Silberston (1978), 
Scott (1979), and Francis (1980a). 
20) There is a potential problem with Steer and Cable (1978) 
vis-a-vis this paper, namely: their regressions of 
profitability on organisational form also include a 
dummy variable of owner versus manager control based 
upon an ad hoc percentage of shares. 
211. As noted in footnote 7), the distributional importance 
of control is discussed with respect to organisational 
form in Cowling (1982a). 
22) The ratio of corporate retentions to income. 
- 172 - 
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES 
Aharoni, Yair, 1966, The foreign investment decision process 
(Harvard University Press). 
Aliber, Robert Z., 1970, A theory of direct foreign invest- 
ment, in: Charles P. Kindleberger, ed., 
The international corporation (MIT). 
Ando, Albert, and Franco Modigliani, 1963, The 'life-cycle' 
hypothesis of saving: aggregate implica- 
tions and tests, American Economic 
Review. 
Asch, Peter, and Joseph J. Seneca, 1975, Characteristics of 
collusive firms, Journal of Industrial 
Economics. 
Ashworth, M. H., J. A. Kay, and T. A. E. Sharpe, 1982, Differ- 
entials between car prices in the United 
Kingdom and Belgium, Institute of Fiscal 
Studies Report Series Number 2. 
d'Aspremont, Claude, and Alexis Jacquemin, 1981, Measuring 
the power to monopolise: a simple-game- 
theoretic approach, Core Discussion 
Paper Number 8139. 
d'Aspremont, Claude, Alexis Jacquemin, and Jean Jaskold 
Gabszewicz, 1979, A note on collusive 
price-leadership, Core Discussion Paper 
Number 7934. 
*## 
Baran, Paul A., and Paul M. Sweezy, 1966, Monopoly capital 
(Penguin). 
Baran, Paul A., and Paul M. Sweezy, 1966a, The multinational 
corporation and modern imperialism, 
in: Richard C. Edwards, Michael Reich, 
and Thomas E. Weisskopf, eds., 1972, The 
capitalist system (Prentice-Hall). 
Berle, Adolph Jr., and Gardiner C. Means, 1967, The modern 
corporation and private property (New 
York: Brace, Harcourt and World). 
Brewer, Anthony, 1980, Marxist theories of imperialism 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul). 
Buckley, Peter J., 1981, A critical review of theories of 
the multinational enterprise, Aussen- 
wirtschaft. 
- 173 - 
Buckley, Peter J., 1982, New theories of international busi- 
ness: some unresolved issues, in: Mark 
C. Casson, ed., The growth of inter- 
national business. 
Buckley, Peter J., and Mark C. Casson, 1976, The future of 
the multinational enterprise (Macmillan). 
Buckley, Peter J., and Mark C. Casson, 1978, A theory of 
international operations, in: Michel 
Ghertman and James Leontiades, eds., 
European research in international busi- 
ness (North Holland). 
Buckley, Peter J., and Peter Enderwick, 1983, Comparative 
pay levels in domestically-owned and 
foreign-owned plants in UK manufacturing- 
evidence from the 1980 workplace industrial 
relations survey, British Journal of 
Industrial Relations. 
Burkitt, Brian, and David Bowers, 1979, Trade unions and the 
economy (Macmillan). 
* * * 
Cable, John R., 1981, Measuring market share mobility and 
entry, Mimeo, University of Warwick. 
Cable, John R., Avinash K. Dixit, Nicholas H. Stern, and 
Paul L. Stoneman, 1980, Concentration 
trends in international industrial 
activities: theoretical and empirical 
considerations for measurement and inter- 
pretation, Mimeo, University of Warwick. 
economists to the theory of international 
production, presented at the Annual 
Conference of the Academy of International 
Business, Bradford, April 1984. 
Casson, Mark C., 1982, Introduction: the conceptual frame- 
work, in: Mark C. Casson, ed., The growth 
of international business. 
Cantwell, John A., 1984, The relevance of the classical 
Casson,. Mark C., 1980, The theory of foreign direct invest- 
ment, University of Reading Discussion 
Papers in International Investment and 
Business Studies Number 50. 
Caves, Richard E., 1974, Industrial organisation, in: John 
H. Dunning, ed., Economic analysis and 
the multinational enterprise (Allen and 
Unwin) . 
Caves, Richard E., -1971,, International corporations: the 
industrial economics of foreign invest- 
ment, Economica. 
Caves, Richard E., 1982, Multinational enterprise and economic 
analysis (Cambridge University Press). 
174 
Chandler, Alfred D., 1980, The growth of the transnational 
industrial firm in the US and UK: a 
comparative analysis, Economic History 
Review. 
Chapman, S. D., 1977, The international houses: the continental 
contribution to British commerce, 1800 - 1860, Journal of European Economic 
History. 
Chenery, Hollis B., 1952, Overcapacity and the acceleration 
principle, Econometrica. 
CIS, 1978, Anti-report: the Ford Motor Company, 
Anti-Report Number 20 (Counter Informa- 
tion Services). 
Clarke, Roger, 1982, Oligopoly and myopic behaviour, Journal 
of Economic Studies. 
Clarke, Roger, and Stephen W. Davies, 1982, Market structure 
and price-cost margins, Economica. 
Coase, R. H., 1937, The nature of the firm, Economica. 
Cooney, Stephen, 1980, Overseas companies as transnational 
actors during the European conquest of 
Africa, British Journal of International 
Studies. 
Cottrell, P. L., 1980, Commercial enterprise, in: Roy Church, 
ed., The dynamics of Victorian business 
(London). 
Cowling, Keith, 1981, Can the British car industry survive?, 
Marxism Today. 
Cowling, Keith, 1982, Excess capacity and the degree of 
collusion: oligopoly behaviour in the 
slump, Mimeo, University of Warwick. 
Cow, ling, Keith, 1982a, Monopoly capitalism (Macmillan). 
Cowling, Keith, 1981a, Oligopoly, distribution and the rate 
of profit, European Economic Review. 
Cowling, Keith, 1976, On the theoretical specification of 
industrial structure-performance rela- 
tionships, European Economic Review. 
Cowling, Keith, and John Cubbin, 1971, Price, quality and 
advertising competition: an econometric 
investigation of the United Kingdom car 
industry, Economica. 
- 175 - 
Cowling, Keith, Michael Dean, Graham Pyatt, and Stuart Wabe, 
1969, An investigation into the demand 
for manpower and its supply in the 
engineering industries: a pilot study, 
CIEBR Research Paper Number 1, University 
of Warwick. 
Cowling, Keith, and Ian Molho, 1982, Wage share, concentration 
and unionism, The Manchester School of 
Economic and Social Studies. 
Cowling, Keith, and Roger Sugden, 1984, Exchange rate adjustment 
and oligopoly pricing behaviour, Mimeo. 
Cowling, Keith, and Michael Waterson, 1974, Price-cost margins 
and market structure, Mimeo, University 
of Warwick. 
Cowling, Keith, and Michael Waterson, 1976, Price-cost margins 
and market structure, Economica. 
Craypo, Charles, 1975, Collective bargaining in the conglomerate, 
multinational firm: Litton's shutdown of 
Royal Typewriter, Industrial and Labour 
Relations Review. 
Cubbin, John, 1983, Apparent collusion and conjectural 
variations in differentiated oligopoly, 
International Journal of Industrial 
Organization. 
Cubbin, John, 1974, A measure of apparent collusion in oli- 
gopoly, Warwick Economic Research Paper 
Number 49. 
Cubbin, John, 1975, oligopoly, advertising, and price-cost 
margins, Mimeo, Queen Mary College London. 
Cubbin, John, 1975a, -Quality change and pricing behaviour in 
the United Kingdom car industry 1956 - 
1968, Economica. 
Cubbin, John, and Dennis Leech, 1983, The effect of share- 
holding dispersion on the degree of 
control in British companies: theory 
and measurement, Economic Journal. 
* * * 
Dickson, V. A., 1981, Conjectural variation elasticities and- 
concentration, Economic Letters. 
Dickson, V. A., 1979, The Lerner index and measures of con- 
centration, Economic Letters. 
- 176- 
Dixit, Avinash K., 1979, A model of duopoly suggesting a 
theory of entry barriers, Bell Journal 
of Economics. 
Dixit, Avinash K., and Nicholas Stern, 1982, Oligopoly and 
welfare: a unified presentation with 
applications to trade and development, 
European Economic Review. 
Droucopoulos, Vassilis, 1981, The non-american challenge: 
a report on the size and growth of the 
world's largest firms, Capital and Class. 
Dunning, John H., 1973, The determinants of international 
production, Oxford Economic Papers 
Dunning, John H., 1979, Explaining changing patterns of 
international production: in defence 
of the eclectic theory, Oxford Bulletin 
of Economics and Statistics. 
Dunning, John H., 1981, Explaining the international direct 
investment position of countries: towards 
a dynamic or developmental approach, 
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv. 
Dunning, John H., 1981a, A note on intra-industry foreign 
direct investment, University of 
Reading Discussion Papers in Interna- 
tional Investment and Business Studies 
Number 52. 
Dunning, John H., 1970, Technology, United States investment, 
and European economic growth, in: 
Charles P. Kindleberger, ed., The inter- 
national corporation (MIT). 
Dunning, John H., 1980, Toward an eclectic theory of inter- 
national production: some empirical 
tests, Journal of International Busi- 
ness Studies. 
Dunning, John H., 1977, Trade, location of economic activity 
and the multinational enterprise: a 
search for an eclectic approach, in: 
"Bertil Ohlin, Per-Ove Nesselborn, and 
Per Magnus Wijkman, eds., The interna- 
tional allocation of economic activity 
(Holmes and Meier). 
Dunning, John H., 1976, United States industry in Britain 
(Wilton House Publications). 
177 - 
Dunning, John H., and Eleanor J. Morgan, 1980, Employee 
compensation in U. S. multinationals 
and indigenous firms: an exploratory 
micro/macro analysis, British Journal of 
Industrial Relations. 
Edwards, Corwin D., 1979, The multimarket enterprise and 
economic power, Journal of Economic 
Issues. 
Edwards, V., 1981, The demand for BL cars: a study of the 
UK and Belgium, Unpublished M. Sc. Dis- 
sertation, University of Warwick. 
Encaoua, David, Paul Geroski, and Alexis Jacquemin, 1982, 
Strategic competition and the persistence 
of dominant firms: a survey, Institut des 
Sciences Economiques, Universite 
Catholique de Louvain, Working Paper 
Number 8206. 
Encaoua, David, and Alexis Jacquemin, 1980, Degree of monopoly, 
indices of concentration and threat of 
entry, International Economic Review. 
Enderwick, Peter, 1983, Multinational collective bargaining: 
an increasingly less likely prospect?, 
Mimeo, The Queen's University of Belfast. 
Erickson, W. Bruce, 1976, Price fixing conspiracies: their 
long term impact, Journal of Industrial 
Economics. 
Executive Office of the President Council on Wage and Price 
Stability, 1976, Aluminium prices 1974-75, 
Staff Report. 
#*# 
Fellner, William 1960, Competition among the few (Kelley). 
Field, Frank, 1979, One in eight: a report on Britain's 
poor, Low Pay Paper Number 28, Low Pay 
Unit, London. 
Fine, Ben, 1982, Multinational corporations, the British 
economy and the alternative economic 
strategy, Birkbeck College Discussion 
Paper Number 111. 
Fine, Ben, and Any Murfin, 1982, Monopoly supply side 
economics: a critique of the Kaleckian 
tradition, Mimeo, Birkbeck College London. 
- 178 - 
Fitch, Robert, 1972, Reply to James O'Connor, Socialist 
Revolution. 
Flowers, Edward Brown, 1976, Oligopolistic reactions in 
European and Canadian direct investment 
in the United States, Journal of Inter- 
national Business Studies. 
Fog, Bjarke, 1956, How are cartel prices determined?, Journal 
of Industrial Economics. 
Formby, John P., and W. James Smith, 1979, The Chamberlin and 
Stackleberg duopoloy relation, Economic 
Record. 
Forsyth, David J. C., 1972, U. S. Investment in Scotland, 
Praeger. 
Francis, Arthur, 1980, Company objectives, managerial motiva- 
tions and the behaviour of large firms: 
an empirical test of the theory of 
'managerial' capitalism, Cambridge 
Journal of Economics. 
Francis, Arthur, 1980a, Families, firms and finance capital: 
the development of UK industrial firms 
with particular reference to their owner- 
ship and control, Sociology. 
Frank, Andre Gunder, 1970, On the mechanism of imperialism: the 
case of Brazil, in: Robert I. Rhodes, ed., 
Imperialism and underdevelopment: a reader, 
Monthly Review Press. 
Friedman, J. W., 1968, Reaction functions and the theory of 
duopoly, Review of Economic Studies. 
Fröbel, Folker, Jürgen Heinrichs and Otto Kreye, 1980, The new 
international division of labour, 
Cambridge University Press. 
* * * 
Gennard, John, 1972, Multinational corporations and British 
labour: a review of attitudes and 
responses, British-North American 
Committee.. 
Geroski, Paul A., 1978, On the international diversification 
of production, Unpublished Ph. D. thesis; 
University of Warwick. 
- 179 - 
Geroski, Paul A., 1983, Some reflections on the theory and 
application of concentration indices, 
International Journal of Industrial 
Organization. 
Giddy, Ian H., 1978, The demise of the product cycle model 
in international business, Columbia 
Journal of World Business. 
Gillies, Grazia Ietto, 1982, The new international division 
of labour and developments in world 
trade and international production, 
Mimeo, Polytechnic of the South Bank. 
Graham, E. M., 1978, Transatlantic investment by multinational 
firms: a rivalistic phenomenon, Journal 
of Post Keynesian Economics. 
Graham, Richard, 1972, Britain and the onset of modernisa- 
tion in Brazil, 1850 - 1914. 
Grahl, John, 1982, Restructuring in the West European econ- 
omy, Mimeo, Queen Mary . 
College London. 
Illi 
Greer, Charles R., and John C. Shearer, 1981, Do foreign-owned 
U. S. firms practice unconventional 
labour relations? Monthly Labour Review. 
Grubel, Herbert G., and P. J. Lloyd, 1975, Intra-industry 
trade (Macmillan). 
* * * 
Heflebower, Richard B., 1961, Stability in oligopoly, 
Manchester School of Economics and Social 
Studies. 
Helleiner, G. K., and Real Lavergne, 1979, Intra-firm trade 
and industrial exports to the United 
States, Oxford Bulletin of Economics 
and Statistics. 
Helfgott, Roy B., 1983, American unions and multinational 
companies: a case of misplaced emphasis, 
Columbia Journal of World Business. 
Hilferding, Rudolf, 1981, Finance capital, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul. 
Hirsch, Fred, 1976, Is there a new international economic 
order, International Organisation. 
Hirsch, Seev, 1976, An international trade and investment 
theory of the firm, Oxford Economic 
Papers. 
- 180 - 
Hirsch, Seev, 1967, Location of industry and international 
competitiveness (Clarendon). 
Hocking, Robin D., 1980, Trade in motor cars between the 
major European producers, Economic 
Journal. 
Holohan, William L., 1978, Cartel problems: comment, American 
Economic Review. 
Hood, Neil, and Stephen Young, 1979, The economics of multi- 
national enterprise (Longman). 
Hudson, Michael, 1982, West German foreign investment since 
1960: tables and notes, Mimeo. 
hymer, Stephen H., 1960, The international operations of 
national firms, published in 1976 (MIT). 
Hymer, Stephen H., 1975, The multinational corporation and 
the law of uneven development, in: 
Hugo Radice, ed., International firms 
and modern imperialism (Penguin). 
Hymer, Stephen H., and Robert Rowthorn, 1970, Multinational 
corporations and international oligopoly: 
the non-american challenge, in: Charles 
P. Kindleberger, ed., The international 
corporation (MIT). 
* * * 
ILO, 1976a, Multinationals in Western Europe: the 
industrial relations experience, Inter- 
national Labour Office. 
ILO, 1976b, Wages and working conditions in multi- 
national Enterprises, International Labour 
Office. 
Iwata, Gyoichi, 1974,, Measurement of conjectural variations 
in oligopoly, Econometrica. 
* * * 
Jacquemin, Alexis, 1982, Imperfect market structure and 
international trade - some recent 
research, Kyklos. 
Jacquemin, Alexis, Tsuruhiko Nambu, and Isabelle Dewez, 1981, 
A dynamic analysis of export cartels: 
the Japanese case, Economic Journal. 
181 
Johnson, Harry G., 1970, The efficiency and welfare implica- 
tions of the international corporation, 
in: Charles P. Kindleberger, ed., The 
international corporation (MIT). 
Jones, Charles A., 1980, Great capitalists and the direction 
of British overseas investment in the 
late nineteenth century: the case of 
Argentina, Business History. 
*# 
Kalecki, Michal, 1939, Essays in the theory of economic fluc- 
tuations (Allen and Unwin). 
Kamien, Morton I., and Nancy L. Schwartz, 1983, Conjectural 
variatiors*, Canadian Journal of Economics. 
Kautsky, Karl, 1970, Ultra-imperialism, New Left Review. 
Kindleberger, Charles P., 1969, American business abroad 
(Yale University Press). 
Kindleberger, Charles P., 1970, ed., The 
international cor- 
poration (MIT). 
Knickerbocker, Frederick 
and multinational 
genterprise r(Harvard)'. 
Kojima, Kiyoshi, 1973, A 
of Economics. 
Kujawa, Duane, 1979a, Collective bargaining and labour 
relations in multinational enterprise: 
a U. S. public policy perspective, in: 
Robert G. Hawkins, ed., Research in 
international business and finance, Vol. 1, 
Jai Press. 
Kujawa, Duane, 1979b, The labour relations of United States 
multinationals abroad: Comparative and 
prospective views, Labour and Society. 
### 
La France, Jeffrey, Andrew Schmitz, and David Zilberman, 1981, 
Price leadership and market shares, 
Mimeo, University of California, Berkeley. 
Lambrinides, Matthew J., 1973, Private saving and the macro- 
economic distribution of income: the 
"classical" and "managerial" savings 
function, Warwick Economic Research 
Paper Number 36. 
- 182 - 
Lane, Frederick C., 1966, Venice and history (Baltimore). 
Lane, Tony, 1982, Dunlop ai the world tyre industry, Mimeo, 
University of Liverpool. 
Lane, Tony, 1982a, The unions: caught on an ebb tide, 
Marxism Today. 
Leech, Dennis, and John Cubbin, 1978, Import penetration in 
the UK passenger car market: a cross- 
section study, Applied Economics. 
Leff, Nathaniel H., 1979, "Monopoly capitalism" and public 
policy in developing countries, Kyklos. 
Lenin, V. I., 1975, Imperialism, the highest stage of cap- 
italism (Foreign Languages Press: 
Peking). 
Lowman,. Peter, 1982, The clothing and textile industries, 
Mimeo. 
Lundgren, Nils, 1977, Comment on Dunning (1977), in: Bertil 
Ohlin, Per-Ove Hesselborn, and Per-Magnus 
Wijkman, The international allocation of 
economic activity (Holmes and Meier). 
Lyons, Bruce R., 1981, Oligopoly and international trade, 
Plimeo, University of Cambridge. 
Lyons, Bruce R., 1982, The pattern of international trade in 
differentiated products: an incentive 
for the existence of multinational firms, 
Mimeo, University of Cambridge. 
Lyons, Bruce R., 1981a, Price-cost margins, market structure 
and international trade, in: D. Currie, 
D. Peel and W. Peters, eds., Micro- 
economic analysis (Croom Helm: London). 
MacEwan, Arthur, 
Magdoff, Harry, 
1972, Capitalist expansion, ideology, and intervention, in: Richard C. Edwards, 
Michael Reich, and Thomas E. Weisskopf, eds., The capitalist system, Prentice-Hall. 
1982, International economic distress and 
the third world, Monthly Review. 
Magdoff, Harry, 1970, Militarism and imperialism, in: 
Richard C. Edwards, Michael Re. ich, and 
Thomas E. Weisskopf, eds., The capitalist 
system (Prentice-Hall), 1972. 
Magdoff, Harry and Paul M. Sweezy, 1969, Notes on the multi- 
national corporation Part Two, Monthly 
Review. 
- 183 - 
Magee, Stephen P., 1981, The appropriability theory of multi- 
national corporation behaviour, University 
of Reading Discussion Papers in Inter- 
national Investment and Business Studies 
Number 51. 
1'! agee, Stephen P., 1977, Information and the multinational 
corporation: an appropriability theory 
of direct foreign investment, in: 
Jagdish N. Bagwati, ed., The new inter- 
national economic order: the north- 
south debate (MIT). 
Marginson, Paul, 1982, The multidivisional firm and control 
over the work process, presented at 
the ninth annual EARIE conference, 
Leuven, September 1982. 
Marglin, Stephen A., 1982, Knowledge and power, presented at 
the SSRC conference on economics and 
work organisation, York, March 1982. 
Marglin, Stephen A., 1974, What do bosses do?, Review of 
Radical Political Economy. Page refer- 
ences in Paper Three refer to the reprint 
in: Andre Gorz, ed., The division of 
labour (Harvester), 1976. 
Marglin, Stephen A., 1975, What do bosses do?, Postscript, 
Harvard Institute of Economic Research 
Discussion Paper Number 429. 
Marris, Robin, 1964, The economic theory of "managerial" 
capitalism (Macmillan). 
Marris, Robin, and Dennis C. Mueller, 1980, The corporation, 
competition, and the invisible hand, 
Journal of Economic Literature. 
Miliband, Ralph, 1969, The state in capitalist society (Quartet). 
Mills, David E., and problems: comment, Americana Economic 
Review. 
Minns, Richard, 1981, 
crA isiss intBron 
"Finance 
itain", Capital 
tandaClass. 
Murfin, Andy, 1982, Unpublished 
Ph. D. thesis, Birkbeck 
College London. 
* 
- 184 - 
Nakase, Toshikazu, 1981, Some characteristics of Japanese- 
type multinational enterprises today, 
Capital and Class. 
Nichols, W. A. T., 1969, Ownership, control and ideology (Allen 
and Unwin). 
Nicholson, Michael, 1972, Oligopoly and conflict (Liverpool 
University Press). 
North, Douglass C., 1979, A framework for analysing the state 
in economic history, Explorations in 
Economic History. 
Nutter, G. Warren, and John H. Moore, 1976, A theory of 
competition, Journal of Law and Econ- 
omics. 
Nyman, Steve, and Aubrey Silberston, 1978, The ownership and 
control of industry, Oxford Economic 
Papers. 
##'# 
Orr, David, and Paul 17. MacAvoy, 1965, Price strategies to 
promote cartel stability, Economica. 
Osborne, D. K., 1976, Cartel problems, American Economic Review. 
Osborne, D. K., 1978, Cartel problems: reply, American Economic 
Review. 
### 
Panic, M., and P. L. Joyce, 1980, UK manufacturing industry: 
international integration and trade 
performance, Bank of England Quarterly 
Bulletin. 
Payne, R., J. Hartley and P. Warr, 1983, Social class and the 
experience of unemployment, Mimeo, 
MRC/SSRC, Social and Applied Psychology 
Unit, University of Sheffield. 
Perlmutter, Howard V., 1969, The tortuous evolution of the 
multinational corporation, in: George 
Modelski, ed., Transnational corpora- 
tions and world order (Freeman), 1979. 
Perry, Martin K., 1982, Oligopoly and consistent con- jectural variations, Bell Journal of 
Economics. 
- 185 - 
Phillips, Almarin, 1972, An econometric study of price-fixing, 
market structure and performance in 
British industry in the early 1950's, 
in: Keith Cowling, ed., Market structure 
and corporate behaviour: theory and 
empirical analysis of the firm (Gray- 
Mills). 
Phill%rs, Almarin, 1962, Market structure, organization and 
performance (Harvard). 
Phillips, Almarin, 1961, A theory of interfirm organization, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
Pitelis, Christos N., 1983, The effects of corporate reten- 
tions on personal savings: tests of 
rival hypotheses, Warwick Economic 
Research Paper Number 231. 
Pitelis, Christos N., 1982, Business saving and the macro- 
economic distribution of income: the 
"monopoly capitalism" saving function. 
Warwick Economic Research Paper Number 
219. 
Preiser, E., 1971, Property, power and the distribution of 
income, in: K. W. Rothschild, ed., Power 
in economics (Penguin). 
### 
Radice, Hugo, 1975, ed., International firms and modern 
imperialism (Penguin). 
Richardson, Peter, and Jean Jacques Van-Helten, 1980, The 
gold mining industry in the Transvaal 
1886-99, in: Peter Warwick, ed., The 
South African war (Longman). 
Robinson, Joan, 1934, What is perfect competition?, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics. Reprinted in 
William Breit and Harold M. Hochman, eds., 
Readings in microeconomics (Holt), 1968. 
Rothschild, K. W., 1971, ed., Power in economics (Penguin). 
Rugman, Alan M., 1975, Motives for foreign investment: the 
market imperfections and risk diversi- 
fication hypotheses, Journal of World 
Trade Law. 
Rugman, Alan M., 1977, Risk, direct investment and interna- 
tional diversification, Weltwirtschaft- 
liches Archiv. 
##* 
- 186 - 
Salop, Steven, 1982, Practices that (credibly) facilitate 
oligopoly coordination, Federal Trade 
Commission Bureau of Economics Working 
Paper Number 73. 
Sampson, Anthony, 1973, The sovereign state (Hodder and 
Stoughton). 
Sawyer, Malcolm C., 1982,. On the specification of structure- 
performance relationships, European 
Economic Review. 
Sawyer, Malcolm C., 1979, Theories of the firm (Weidenfield 
and Nicolson). 
Scherer, F. M., 1980, Industrial market structure and economic 
performance (Rand McNally). 
Schmalensee, Richard, 1980, The new industrial organization 
and the economic analysis of modern 
markets, Mimeo, MIT. 
Scott, John, 1979, Corporations, classes and capitalism 
(Hutchinson). 
Scott, John, and Michael Hughes, 1976, Ownership and control 
in a satellite economy: a discussion 
from Scottish data, Sociology. 
Sherman, Roger, 1971, Experimental oligopoly, Kyklos. 
Siddharthan, N. S. and Sanjaya Lall, 1982, The recent growth 
of the largest US multinationals, Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics. 
SMMT, 1979, The motor industry of Great Britain 1979 
(The Society of Motor Manufacturers 
and Traders). 
Steer, P., and J. R. Cable, 1973, Internal organization and profit: 
an empirical analysis of large UK com- 
panies, Journal of Industrial Economics. 
Steuer, Max and John Gennard, 1971, Industrial relations, 
labour disputes and labour utilisation 
in foreign-owned firms in the United 
Kingdom, in: John H. Dunning, ed., The 
multinational enterprise, Allen and Unwin. 
Stigler, George J., 1968, The organization of industry 
(Richard D. Urwin). 
Stigler, George J., 1964, A theory of oligopoly, Journal of 
Political Economy. 
Stocking, George W., and Myron W. Watkins, 1951, Monopoly and 
free enterprise (Twentieth Century Fund). 
_ 187 - ll 
Taylor, Robert, 1982, Multinationals throw a spanner in the 
works, The observer. 
#** 
Ullman, Lloyd, 1975, Multinational unionism: incentives, 
barriers, and alternatives, Industrial 
Relations. 
Ulph, David, 1983, Rational conjectures in the theory of 
oligopoly, International Journal of 
Industrial Organization. 
*# 
Van Herck, G., 1982, Corporate monopoly power and risk, 
European Economic Review. 
Vernon, Raymond; 1972, The economic and political 
consequences of multinational enterprise: 
an anthology, Harvard. 
Vernon, Raymond, 1970, Future of the multinational enter- 
prises, in: Charles P. Kindleberger, 
ed., The international corporation (MIT). 
Vernon, Raymond, 1966, International investment and interna- 
tional trade in the product cycle, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
Vernon, Raymond, 1974, The location of economic activity, in: 
John H. Dunning, ed., Economic analysis 
and the multinational enterprise (Allen 
and Unwin). 
Vernon, Raymond, 1979, The product cycle hypothesis in a new 
international environment, Oxford' Bulletin 
of Economics and Statistics. 
Vernon, Raymond, 1977, Storm over the multinationals (Macmillan). 
Vicziany, Marika, 1979, Bombay merchants and structural changes 
in the export community 1850 to 1880, in: 
K. N. Chaudhuri and C. Dewey, eds., 
Economy and Society. 
### 
Waltz, Kenneth N., 1970, The myth of national interdependence, 
in: Charles P. Kindleberger, ed., The international corporation (MIT). 
Warr, P., R. Payne, and J. Hartley, 1983, Social class and the experience of unemployment. Mimeo, 
MRC/SSRC Social and Applied Psychology 
Unit, University of Sheffield. 
- 188 - 
Weisskopf, Thomas E., 1972, Capitalism and underdevelopment 
in the modern world, in: Richard C. 
Edwards, Michael Reich, and Thomas E. 
Weisskopf, eds., The capitalist system 
(Prentice-Hall). 
Weisskopf, Thomas E., 1972a, United States foreign private 
investment: an empirical survey, in: 
Richard C. Edwards, Michael Reich, and 
Thomas E. Weisskopf, eds., The capitalist 
system (Prentice-Hall) 
Wilkins, Mira, 1975, Comment on Charles Wilson, in: Harold 
F. Williamson, ed., Evolution of inter- 
national management structures (Delaware). 
Wilkins, Mira, 1970, The emergence of multinational enterprise: 
American business abroad from the colonial 
era to 1914 (Harvard). 
Williamson, Oliver E., 1970, Corporate control and business 
behavior (Prentice-Hall). 
Williamson, Oliver E., 1965, A dynamic theory of interfirm 
behavior, Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
Wilson, Charles, 1975, Multinationals, management, and world 
markets: a historical view, in: Harold 
F. Williamson, ed., Evolution of inter- 
national management structures (Dela-. 
ware). 
Wolf, Bernard M., 1977, Industrial diversification and inter- 
nationalization: some empirical evidence, 
Journal of Industrial Economics. 
### 
Yamey, B. S., 1972, Notes on secret price-cutting in oli- 
gopoly, in: Marcelle Kooy, ed., Studies 
in economics and economic history 
(Macmillan). 
Yamin, M., 1980, Direct foreign investment as an instrument 
of corporate rivalry: theory-and evidence 
from the LDC's, University of Manchester 
Department of Economics Working Paper 
Number 13. 
##* 
Zeitlin, Maurice, 1974, Corporate ownership and control: 
the-large corporation and the capitalist 
class, American Journal of Sociology. 
